D E C I S I O N No. 1
Sofia, 13 March 2025
The Constitutional Court, sitting in the formation of:
Chairperson:
Pavlina Panova
and Members:
Nadezhda Dzhelepova
Borislav Belazlekov
Atanas Semov
Desislava Atanasova
Krasimir Vlahov
Galina Toneva
Yanaki Stoilov
Sasho Penov
Sonya Yankulova
Nevin Feti,
and
with the participation of recording secretary Desislava Penkova reviewed on 13 March 2025 in closed session constitutional case No. 33/2024 (joined cases) reported by judges Sonya Yankulova and Yanaki Stoilov.
The proceedings in the stage of pronouncing on the merits are under Article 149, para 1, item 7 read in combination with Article 66 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria.
Constitutional case No. 33/2024 and joined cases Nos. 34/2024, 35/2024, 36/2024, and 37/2024 have been initiated upon a request of Members of the 50th and 51st National Assembly (NA) seeking to establish illegality of the parliamentary elections for the 51st National Assembly held on 27 October 2024 as declared by Decision No. 3972-НС of 30 October 2024 of the Central Election Committee (CEC), and in particular to establish illegality of the election of each of the MPs in the 51st National Assembly announced by CEC Decision No. 3998-НС of 31 October 2024.
The applicants in constitutional case No. 33/2024 are 67 MPs from the 50th NA who challenge the 51st NA parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024, in particular the results of 52 specified polling stations, on account of wrongly entering the election outcome in the protocol of the precinct election committee (PEC) and PEC members unlawfully tampering with paper ballots, as well as on account of lack of real time video monitoring and video recording of the vote counting and compilation of the protocol after announcing the end of the election day in the same precinct election committees.
The applicants in constitutional case No. 34/2024 are 58 MPs from the 50th NA. They maintain that the 51st NA parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 were illegal on account of violations related to: 1) setting up polling stations and compiling voter lists; 2) constituting the membership of the precinct election committees and substituting PEC members; 3) voting; 4) taking stock of the paper ballot and machine vote when reporting election results; 5) manipulating the electoral vote by ‘transferring votes validly cast by one party to another party’; 6) compiling the protocols of precinct and constituency election commissions; 7) ‘vote buying’; 8) electoral campaign, and Article 205 of the Election Code indicating specific polling stations where these violations occurred.
The applicants in constitutional case No. 35/2024 are 65 MPs from the 51st NA. They maintain that the 51st NA parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 were unlawful and challenge the results from each of the multi-mandate electoral constituency, alleging non-compliance with the standards for holding elections set forth in the Constitution, the Election Code, EU law and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; violations in vote counting and entering results in the protocols of the precinct election commissions, which in combination with the poor turnout leads to alternations of the voting results. They further allege specific violations of the Election Code and the methodological instructions of the Central Election Commission in concrete polling stations.
The applicants in constitutional case No. 36/2024 are 50 MPs from the 51st NA. They maintain that the 51st NA parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 were unlawful alleging: 1) violations and offences as regards citizens’ political rights; 2) violations ‘related to precinct election commissions compiling and submitting electoral protocols’; 3) violations ‘related to recording video monitoring that was either switched off, not working, or wrongly recording vote counting in polling stations’; 4) ‘multiple problems with machine vote’; 5) ‘discrepancies between data recorded on USB sticks and the election protocols’; 6) violations ‘related to data about the total number of voters and the number of Bulgarian nationals’; 7) replacing members of precinct election commissions on reflection day and e-day, specifying particular polling stations.
The applicants in constitutional case No. 37/2024 are 60 MPs from the 51st NA. They challenge the legality of the 51st NA parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024, specifying in particular 452 polling stations, and alleging violations of Article 272 read in combination with Article 57, item 34 and Article 280, paras 1 and 2 in combination with Article 279, para 1, items 1-6 Election Code.
By way of rulings dated 26 November 2024 the Constitutional Court admitted the requests made by the applicants in the five cases for review on the merits and constituted as interested parties for each of them the following: the National Assembly, President, Council of Ministers, Supreme Court of Cassation, Supreme Administrative Court, Prosecutor General, and Central Election Commission. The Constitutional Court allowed a fourteen-day period for the interested parties to present their opinions, and the applicants to present their further comments.
The subject matter of all cases being identical, namely the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024, the Court joined all cases for a single review under constitutional case No. 33/2024 and proceeded with all procedural steps under it.
The Central Election Commission (CEC) was the only one of all constituted interested parties under constitutional case No. 33/2024 and remaining joined cases that presented an opinion within the time-limit set down by the Court. Therein the CEC made a comprehensive overview of the legal framework of the electoral process and the statutory acts adopted by CEC for the purpose of organizing the election process. CEC finds the allegations of ‘unlawfulness of the elections held due to violations in conducting the video monitoring and discrepancies between data recorded in the USB keys and data recorded in the precinct election commission protocols to be unjustified by law since the Election Code does not determine the USB keys as a means to take account of the election outcome’. It points out the ‘phantom polling stations’ specified in the application in constitutional case No. 34/2024 joined to constitutional case No. 33/2024 were set up as mobile election commissions and their protocols were part of the accounted election results published on CEC website in section ‘Results’ for each polling station and each constituency’.
Only the applicant in constitutional case No. 34/2024 submitted further comments within the time-limit allowed by the Court. The applicant furnished ‘additional data’ in a document entitled ‘additional application’, namely ‘the remaining part of the results of the surveys conducted by our experts as regards the data from the elections held on 27 October 2024 and an adjacent analysis’. The ‘additional application’ sets out the applicant’s view as regards problems in compiling voter lists, provides information about alleged violations of the election Code requirements for setting up polling stations, giving an example with setting up polling stations in the municipalities of the 09 Kardzhali constituency. The ‘additional application’ further provides detailed information about setting up and voting by way of ‘mobile polling stations, which is indicative of vote buying’. The applicant shares his understanding about ‘established discrepancies of the results recorded in paper protocols and results from the machine vote recorded in USB keys’, about ‘violations established in video recordings from missing polling stations’ and about ‘widespread replacements in the membership’ of precinct election commissions in violation of Articles 89, 91, and 105 Election Code. The applicant alleges ‘illegitimacy of the elections in the affected polling stations’ and violations on the part of the District Election Commission in 25 Sofia Constituency as regards the registration of Free Voters Coalition comprising Green Union Political Party, Republicans for Bulgaria Political Party, and Union of the Free Democrats Political Party.
The applicant made the following requests regarding the collection of further evidence: ‘recount of ballots, including verifying conformity of voter lists with ballots validly cast’; ‘review of the decisions for changes in the precinct election commissions’; ‘analysis of the video recordings with a view to establishing violations’; ‘set new elections’; ‘establish violations – are the actions of the District Election Commission in 25 Sofia Constituency in violation of the law’; ‘quash the elections in 25 Sofia Constituency’; ‘give recommendations for reforms – the Constitutional Court to propose amendments to the regulatory framework’; ‘give injunctions – the Constitutional Court to order that fresh elections be held in 25 Sofia Constituency’; ‘the Central Election Commission to establish clear rules for e-submission of documents’.
The fourteen-day period extended to the applicants for presenting further comments as specified in the rulings of 26 November 2024 is not meant for the applicant to change the purpose of the request with which the applicant seized the Court and which the Court admitted for review on the merits. In the ‘additional application’ presented within the set time-limit the applicant under constitutional case No. 34/2024 in fact makes a new request different from the one of 8 November 2024 where he seeks establishing the illegality of the elections in their entirety. Now he seeks ‘quashing the elections’ specifically in 25 Sofia Constituency and setting new elections in this particular constituency due to violations made in relation to Free Voters Coalition. This new request has been made after the period set forth in Article 305, para 2 of the Election Code (EC), which is why the Court should not adjudicate on it but take no further action as the legislator has related the possibility of seizing the Constitutional Court with requests under Article 149, para 1, item 7 in conjunction with Article 66 of the Constitution to a period, namely fifteen days as of the Central Election Commission announcing the results of the elections (Article 305, para 2 EC), which period has expired on 15 November 2024.
In his ‘additional application’ the applicant under constitutional case No. 34/2024 provided a detailed overview of all mobile polling stations. The applicant seeks no further action for collecting evidence as regards the mobile polling stations but alleges instead that ‘from these data it may be concluded that the mobile polling stations were created in response to the needs of particular parties’. In his request of 8 November 2024 the applicant does not claim violations in setting up all mobile polling stations and does not furnish evidence to that end. He has specified only four ‘phantom polling stations’ in 12 Montana Constituency which have not be found at the address specified when checks were made. Thus, the Court has not been duly seized with a request to verify the lawful setting up of all mobile polling stations and establish the validity of all votes cast in this way.
The requests made by the applicants under constitutional cases Nos 34/2024, 35/2024, and 36/2024 are requests seeking to establish the illegality of the elections in their entirety, while the requests made by the applicants in constitutional cases Nos 33/2024 and 37/2024 as well as the request made by the applicant in constitutional case No. 35/2024 ‘in the alternative’ seek to establish illegality of the election results in specific polling stations. The summary arguments of all applicants support allegations of violations at different stages of the electoral process – preparation and conduct of elections (voting and vote counting) carried out by the authorities of the election administration (election commissions of different ranking).
The objective of holding parliamentary elections is to provide democratic legitimacy of a nationally representative establishment within the meaning of Article 1, para 2 in conjunction with Articles 10 and 64 of the Constitution. The objective of the review of legality of elections that the Constitutional Court performs is to establish legality of Parliament’s composition and protect citizens’ active and passive voting rights.
Thus, elections’ legality must be assessed with a view to possible changes in Parliament’s composition in case violations in the electoral process have been established. However, not every single violation of the election rules may serve as a ground to pronounce the illegality of elections but only those violations that genuinely affect the outcome by distorting election results. It is only then that elections as a form of citizens’ political involvement in the democratic political process have failed to achieve their goal – to translate citizens’ choices in a legitimate public authority (Decision No. 4/2011 in constitutional case No. 4/2011; Decision No. 3/2017 in constitutional case No. 11/2016).
It is a fact that this particular characteristic of elections – to provide legitimate citizens’ representation – is the source of a heightened sensitivity to violating election standards prescribed by law or established in good international practices as respect for these standards is a guarantee for the democratic nature of the representative establishment. To allow for the timely elimination of every single violation in the course of the election process, the legislature has envisaged different forms of participation and different forms of control by the participants in the electoral process at every stage of the election process. It is these forms of participation and active recourse to them that serve as a guarantee for the lawful and democratic organization and conduct of the elections and for the transparent and accurate determination of the election outcome in accordance with the voters’ political will (Decision No. 13/2013 in constitutional case No. 14/2013).
In the proceedings challenging the legality of elections the Constitutional Court does not act ex officio but only within the confines of what it has been seized with and admitted for review on the merits (Decision No. 2/2010 in constitutional case No. 10/2009). This lays particular responsibility on the applicants as to their assessment of the significance of the alleged violations of the electoral process and election results and the evidence they corroborate their allegations with.
In the case at hand the Constitutional Court has been seized by 300 MPs from the 50th and 51st National Assembly – 125 MPs from the 50th NA and 175 MPs from the 51st NA. In fact, 99 MPs from the 50th NA and 93 MPs from the 51st NA seized the Court since the MPs signed more than one request in their capacity of MPs respectively in the 50th NA or 51st NA, and 69 MPs signed the requests in their capacity of MPs in both the 50th NA and the 51st NA. The requests are signed by MPs in different political formations: Velichie, There is Such a People (ITN), Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS), Alliance for Rights and Freedoms (APS), We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria (PP-DB), and BSP for Bulgaria – United Left (BSP).
What could be the reason for the MPs to seize the Constitutional Court with five requests seeking to establish illegality of the elections, all signed by them in different combinations and alleging identical violations is a question that falls outside the subject matter of the case. The number of requests and the number of MPs who signed them (and which is above the threshold required by Article 150, para 1 of the Constitution in conjunction with Article 305, para 2 EC) are irrelevant to the merits of the requests, yet they demonstrate that more than half of the parliamentary represented parties or coalitions in the 51st National Assembly harbour doubts as to the legality of the elections.
Three hundred MPs altogether seizing the Court is symptomatic of the MPs’ understanding of the role, place and functions of the parties they represent for the preparation and conduct of the elections. Parties’ active involvement in the preparation and conduct of elections with a view to guarantee every citizen’s fair vote is the most effective means to enhance confidence in the electoral process and by extension enhance confidence in the public authority that these elections resulted in and which parties aspire to by participating in the elections. Failure to make recourse to this instrument often makes it impossible to establish violations and eliminate their consequences.
The Constitutional Court considers it necessary to remind that the Election Code regulates the electoral process in such a way as to guarantee the involvement of political parties at every stage of the preparation and conduct of elections. It is precisely the parliamentary represented parties that avail of the most opportunities as provided by the law to take part in the preparation and organization of the electoral process. The way the election administration is formed and the means available for review the lawfulness of its acts at every stage of the electoral process, including on election day, by the political parties themselves, or by candidates’ advocates, observers, and parties’ representatives, are all but a means of parties’ active participation in the preparation and conduct of elections. The political parties are called through all these persons to act in a way that guarantees the proper exercise of every citizen’s right to vote and stand as a candidate in accordance with the established rules for conducting elections in a democratic state governed by the rule of law.
Further on, the Constitutional Court considers it necessary to expressly point out that the Election Code adopted by the National Assembly pursuant to Article 42, para 2 of the Constitution and promulgated in State Gazette issue No. 19 of 5 March 2014, in the version applicable on 27 October 2024, has been amended 27 times, including as a result of four decisions of the Constitutional Court, and it served as the legal basis for conducting nine parliamentary elections over the course of 10 years. The significant number of amendments of the Election Code which, although not affecting the system for determining the election results (with the exception of the amendment of Article 267, para 1, item 6 EC ‘I do not support anyone’ and the preferential vote), affect significantly the set of rules that regulate the preparation and conduct of elections. This fact alone does not contribute to establishing and enhancing confidence in the electoral process and its results to guarantee every citizen’s universal, equal, and direct suffrage by a secret ballot.
It must further be taken into account that the challenged elections have been conducted according to statutory rules identical to the ones applicable to the former elections (but for Article 9, para 1 EC and the incorporation of the hypotheses of Article 97a and Article 99b, paras 3 and 4 of the Civil Registration Act therein) that were conducted only four months earlier, on 9 June 2024. This means that the omissions in the legal regulation and the organization of the electoral process must have been known to the participants in the challenged elections as they had already had the chance to test in practice the efficiency of the applicable legal regulation in the former elections and to take action for the elimination of the omissions and deficiencies.
The legality review by the Constitutional Court of the parliamentary elections pursuant to Article 149, para 1, item 7 in conjunction with Article 66 of the Constitution is a last resort measure that should be used only insofar as, despite all other means of control (including control by the parties taking part in the elections), there are violations that may affect the composition of the nationally representative establishment, either in its entirety or as regards the election of individual Members of Parliament.
In this case the applicants allege violations in the course of preparing and conducting the elections on the very election day, mainly in relation to casting the vote and determining the election results by the electoral administration. If proven, these violations could lead to changes in the composition of the 51st National Assembly. It must be taken into account further on that some of the violations alleged by the applicants that concern the counting of votes for one particular party, namely Velichie, were broadcasted by the media immediately after closure of the election day and became public. At the same time, pursuant to section I.8 of Decision No. 3972- НС of the Central Election Commission of 30 October 2024 on the results of the voting and allocation of seats in the 51st National Assembly, this same party missed 21 votes to be represented in Parliament.
Prima facie, the alleged violations could affect the composition of the 51st National Assembly. Taken together with the fact that the Constitutional Court has been seized by MPs from different parliamentary parties and coalitions, this gives grounds to the Constitutional Court to carry out a comprehensive check of the election results in order to preserve the confidence in the power of representation and the democratic state.
The Constitutional Court does the legality review of the challenged elections on the basis of the Constitution and the Election Code, taking further into account the commitments duly made by the country as regards citizens’ right to vote laid down in acts adopted pursuant to Article 5, para 4 of the Constitution as well as international standards that Bulgaria has adhered to, basically Article 21, paras 1 and 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948, Bulgaria being a member of the UN since 15 December 1955; Article 25b of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ratified by Decree No. 1199 of the Presidium of the National Assembly of 23 July 1970, promulgated in State Gazette No. 60/1970; Article 3 of the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ratified by law, promulgated SG No. 66/1992, promulgated SG No. 80/1992); the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe acts and in particular the opinions of the European Commission for Democracy through Law as its advisory body.
The legality review performed by the Constitutional Court is limited by the legal means available to the Court pursuant to the legislation in force, which has failed to establish an express procedure for conducting a legality review of parliamentary elections. This fact alone does not contribute to enhancing the confidence in the electoral process, which in turn affects the effective exercise of the right to vote.
Having no express statutory regulation of the terms and procedure for challenging the legality of elections before the Constitutional Court, the Court, relying on the Constitution, Election Code, Constitutional Court Act and Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court, has carried out a check of the violations alleged by the applicants.
It should be pointed out that as regards the outcome of the voting, it cannot be expected for the Constitutional Court to establish facts and circumstances that are not objectified in the tangible carrier of the vote cast or such that may not be ascertained following a check by the Court of the ballots and documents drawn up by the precinct election commissions establishing the votes cast in the respective polling station. The legality review of elections that the Constitutional Court does is a means to correct infringements that are relevant to the final outcome and can be demonstrated, but not such that that give rise to doubts or suspected fraud and may be justified solely by analyzing the election results (Decision No. 5/2013 in constitutional case No. 13/2013). The Court is not an authority that establishes offences against the political rights of citizens committed in the course of the electoral process as laid down in Chapter Three, Section III of the Criminal Code.
Indicating an abundancy of, or in some applications all polling stations that need to be checked by the Court demonstrates poor understanding of the purpose and objective of the legality review of the electoral process by the Constitutional Court and precludes the possibility to establish in an undisputable manner and in shortest possible terms the finality of the election outcome – something that strengthens the stability of the state in constitutional democracy (Decision No. 12/2011 in constitutional case No. 11/2011). This is further on symptomatic of underestimating the nature and efficiency of the other means of control of the electoral process which the legislature has expressly provided to the legal entities that have seized the Court – namely the political parties taking part in the elections. It fails to account for the public significance and weight of challenging election results before the Constitutional Court, which only serves to heighten the standard of proof for the alleged violations. It takes no account of the need to strike a balance between the length of judicial proceedings and the need of a timely resolution of the election dispute (Ruling No. 8/2010 in constitutional case No. 7/2010; Ruling No. 4/2010 in constitutional case No. 8/2010).
The review by the Constitutional Court is not a means in substitute for the action that the political entities participating in the elections can take themselves in the framework of the electoral process. Nor is it a means to compensate the timely implementation of the opportunities provided for in the law for securing the legality of the electoral process. The review by the Constitutional Court may not amend the regulatory framework in which the challenged elections have been conducted, nor may it eliminate the consequences of all omissions and violations committed in the course of the preparation and conduct of the elections.
To check the credibility of the violations in the electoral process alleged by the applicants and in accordance with the existing regulations, the Court commissioned an expert assessment tasked (task 1) to count the votes cast by a paper ballot and those cast by a machine vote in each of the polling stations that the applicants have specifically identified, and to determine: whether the number of validly cast votes as per candidates’ (parties’, coalitions’, independent candidates’) lists corresponds to the number of votes entered in the protocols of the respective precinct election commissions; whether the number of validly cast machine votes as per candidates’ (parties’, coalitions’, independent candidates’) lists corresponds to the information recorded in the memory of the specialized voting device; whether the protocols of the precinct election commission under Article 273 EC have been drawn up in accordance with the statutory requirements laid down in Article 274, para 3 EC. Pursuant to the ruling of the Court of 26 November 2024 in constitutional case No. 33/2024, the scope of this task covered 1,777 polling stations.
By rulings dated 14 and 16 January 2024 the Court adopted the conclusions of the experts summarized in tables and covering a total of 1,768 polling stations. No checks have been performed in relation to nine polling stations specified in the ruling of the Court of 26 November 2024 for the following reasons: polling station 020100029 entered in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency falls within the scope of the second expert assessment commissioned by the Court; polling stations 011110003, 026540002, 034610096, 082600020, 1927000175, and 213300085 as indicated by the applicants and included in the scope of the expert assessment do not exist; and polling stations 092100061 and 234602022 are indicated in the ruling twice.
The checks of the experts established for each of the polling stations subject to expert assessment the following information presented in a table format: the number of paper ballots under section 5; the number of invalidly cast votes under section 6; the number of paper ballots with validly cast votes ‘I do not support anyone’ under section 7; the number of validly cast machine votes under section 11; the number of validly cast votes ‘I do not support anyone’ under section 12; and the distribution of votes from paper ballots and machine vote among candidates’ lists as per the numbering in the protocol of the precinct election commission – Annex No. 75-НС-х, Annex No. 76-НС-хм, and Annex No. 77-НС-чх established by Decision No. 3706-НС of 16 September 2024 of the Central Election Commission.
The Court admitted an expert assessment tasked (task 2) to establish whether the number of invalidly cast ballots entered in the protocol under Article 273 EC corresponds to the number of the invalidly cast ballots submitted to the district election commissions by the precinct election commissions in the polling stations specified by the applicants. This task covered a total of 441 polling stations in accordance with the ruling of the Court of 26 November 2024 in constitutional case No. 33/2024. By a ruling dated 16 January 2024 the Court adopted the conclusions of the experts summarized in tables and covering a total of 436 polling stations. The experts did not check five polling stations that were covered by the checks under task 1, namely polling stations Nos. 020400148, 024000149, 020100021, 020900020, and 162202039. For polling station 223100039 in 22 Smolyan Constituency, polling station 273100089 in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency, polling station 301000017 in 30 Shumen Constituency, and polling stations Nos. 321180521, 321180533, 321180542, 321180561, 321180595, 321180661, 321180670 and 321180671 abroad, the Court admitted the conclusions of the experts but did not include the results in the calculation of the overall election results since the election results from these polling stations were the subject of checks and expert assessment under task 1, which comprised the result of the assessment under task 2 for these polling stations.
Upon receipt of the expert assessments, the Court established that for some polling stations the ballots presented to the Court did not contain the complete range of election documents required for the purpose of the assessment. Thus, by a ruling dated 21 January 2025 the Court had to request from the Central Election Commission information whether ballots were available and kept in the respective municipal administrations according to the statutory procedure for the following polling stations: polling stations Nos. 020400053, 020400148, 020400149, 020400194, and 020400261 in 02 Burgas Constituency; polling station 090200015 in Kardzhali Constituency; polling station 143200013 in 14 Constituency; polling station 172600026 in 17 Plovdiv Constituency; polling stations Nos 234610009 and 234615013 in 23 Sofia Constituency; polling stations Nos 270700016; 273100115, and 273600017 in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency; polling station 283500103 in 28 Targovishte Constituency. Should these ballots were available, the Central Election Commission had to present them to the Constitutional Court. Further on, ballots from polling station 272400023 from 27 Stara Zagora Constituency were requested as the ballots from polling station 272400022 were presented instead, and the latter was not subject to the commissioned expert assessment.
The Central Election Commission presented additionally to the Court ballots from polling stations Nos 020400053, 020400148, 020400149, 020400194, and 020400261 in 02nd Burgas Constituency; polling station 143200013 in 14th Pernik Constituency; polling station 172600026 in 17th Plovdiv Constituency; polling stations Nos 234610009 and 234615013 in 23rd Sofia Constituency; and polling station 272400023 in 27th Stara Zagora Constituency (letter of the Central Election Commission, outgoing correspondence No. ЦИК-НС-07-2476/66/ of 27 January 2025 and incoming correspondence No. 67 of 28 January 2025 of the Constitutional Court).
The Court examined these ballots and registered the results in 10 protocols adjoined to the evidence of the case. The Court further entered its findings as regards the elections outcome from nine of the additionally checked polling stations, namely Nos 020400053, 020400148, 020400149, 020400194, 020400261, 143200013, 172600026, 234615013, and 272400023, in protocols containing information in the set table format, which it also adjoined to the evidence in the case. No new protocol in table format was drawn up for polling station No. 234610009 in 23rd Sofia Precinct as the Court did not establish any differences from the findings in the expert assessment, namely that 54 paper ballots and 111 machine vote ballots according to the protocol of the precinct election commission were missing.
The Court did not receive any additional ballots from the following polling stations: No. 090200015, 09th Kardzhali Constituency; Nos 270700016, 273100115, and 273600017, 27th Stara Zagora Constituency; and No. 283500103, 28th Targovishte Constituency. Instead, the Central Election Commission presented for these polling stations opinions of the mayors of Ardino, Galabovo, Stara Zagora, Chirpan, and Targovishte Municipalities, stating that the ballots from the said polling stations had been submitted to the Central Election Commission, and that no other ballots from these polling stations were kept in the municipal administrations. The expert assessment established the following in relation to these polling stations: for polling station No. 090200015, 09th Kardzhali Constituency – missing machine vote ballots (14 ballots according to the protocol of the precinct election commission); for polling station No. 270700016 – missing paper ballots (335 ballots according to the protocol of the precinct election commission) and machine vote ballots (16 ballots according to the protocol of the precinct election commission); for polling station No. 273100115 – missing paper ballots (145 ballots according to the protocol of the precinct election commission); for polling station No. 273600017 – missing machine vote ballots (99 ballots according to the protocol of the precinct election commission) – all three polling stations are in the 27th Stara Zagora Constituency; for polling station No. 283500103, 28th Targovishte Constituency – missing paper ballots (294 according to the protocol of the precinct election commission).
The task 1 expert assessment admitted by the Court led it to commission a graphological expert assessment to establish whether the marks ticking the respective voter’s choice on the specifically identified 287 paper ballots from three polling stations, namely polling station No. 060800027 in 06th Vratsa Constituency, polling station No. 122400033 in 12th Montana Constituency, and polling station No. 152400205 in 15th Pleven Constituency, had been put on each of the paper ballots by individual voters. By a ruling dated 6 February 2025 the Court admitted the conclusions from the graphological expert assessment, which established that the marks ticking the voter’s choice on 95 paper ballots from polling station No. 060800027 in 06th Vratsa Constituency, 72 paper ballots from polling station No. 122400033 in 12th Montana Constituency, and 106 paper ballots from polling station No. 152400205, in 15th Pleven Constituency had not been placed by individual voters but by one or two identical persons instead.
This required the Court to draw up protocols for these three polling stations with information in the established table format to reflect the results of the graphological expert assessment. Hence, the number of paper ballots where the voter’s choice had been marked not by an individual voter but by one and the same person were entered as invalidly cast votes. The Court adjoined these protocols to the evidence in the case.
The task 1 expert assessment admitted by the Court led it to require from the Central Election Commission information about the outset of the voting; the precise time each vote was cast; and the end of the voting in the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 in polling stations Nos 090800006, 090800016, and 090800038 in 09th Kardzhali Constituency as well as in polling stations Nos 321180531 and 321180541 abroad.
To conclude on the violations alleged by the applicants in the preparation of the electoral process and the organization of the Election Day, the Court required from the Central Election Commission: 1) information about the polling stations falling under the exemption provided for in Article 57, para 1, item 34 of the Election Code; 2) information about the polling stations for which the exemption provided for in Article 57, para 1, item 34 EC did not apply and the reasons therefor, but where nevertheless no real time video monitoring and video recording during vote counting and drawing up of protocols was effected after the end of E Day had been announced; 3) protocols from the precinct election commissions falling within the scope of task 1 expert assessment under the ruling of 26 November 2024 in constitutional case No. 33/2024, with enclosed defect machine vote ballots; 4) information about changes in the composition of the precinct election commissions effected after the time limit set forth in Article 89, paras 1 and 2 EC; 5) information about the results of the check commissioned by way of Decision No. 3907-НС of 24 October 2024 of the Central Election Commission regarding DG Civil Registration and Administrative Service in the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works and its territorial units and voting in violation of the rules set forth in the Election Code at the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024.
By a ruling dated 17 February 2025 in constitutional case No. 33/2024 the Court admitted the requested documentary evidence provided by the Central Election Commission: 1) information about the implementation of the ruling of 26 November 2024 in constitutional case No. 33/2024 to provide the ballots from the polling stations falling within the scope of the admitted expert assessment – a letter from the Central Election Commission, outgoing correspondence No. ЦИК-НС-07-2476/7/ of 28 November 2024 and ingoing correspondence No. 645 of 2 December 2024 of the Constitutional Court; 2) a list of the polling stations falling under the exemption provided for in Article 57, para 1, item 34 of the Election Code – a letter from the Central Election Commission, outgoing correspondence No. ЦИК-НС-07-2476/24/ of 3 December 2024 and ingoing correspondence No. 664 of 3 December 2024 of the Constitutional Court; 3) a list of the polling stations for which the exemption provided for in Article 57, para 1, item 34 EC did not apply and the reasons therefor but where nevertheless no real time video monitoring and video recording during vote counting and drawing up of protocols was effected after the end of E Day had been announced (43 polling stations) – a letter from the Central Election Commission, outgoing correspondence No. ЦИК-НС-07-2476/42/ of 5 December 2024 and ingoing correspondence No. 670 of 5 December 2024 of the Constitutional Court; 4) protocols of the precinct election commissions falling under the scope task 1 of the expert assessment under the ruling of 26 November 2024 in constitutional case No. 33/2024, with enclosed defect machine vote ballots – 422 precinct election commissions (23 folders and 4 binders) – a letter from the Central Election Commission, outgoing correspondence No. ЦИК-НС-07-2476/50/ of 17 December 2024 and ingoing correspondence No. 702 of 18 December 2024 of the Constitutional Court; 5) information about changes in the composition of the precinct election commissions effected after the time limit set forth in Article 89, paras 1 and 2 EC (8 binders, 4 folders and one USB flash memory stick) – a letter from the Central Election Commission, outgoing correspondence No. ЦИК-НС-07-2476/51/ of 17 December 2024 and ingoing correspondence No. 703 of 18 December 2024 of the Constitutional Court 703; 6) information about ballots presented to the Constitutional Court from the following polling stations: 02nd Burgas Constituency – 020400053, 020400148, 020400149, 020400194, 020400261; 14th Pernik Constituency – 143200013; 17th Plovdiv Constituency – 172600026; 23rd Sofia Constituency – 234610009, 234615013; 27th Stara Zagora Constituency – 272400023; information in implementation of ruling dated 28 November 2025 in constitutional case No. 33/2024 – a letter from the Central Election Commission, outgoing correspondence No. ЦИК-НС-07-2476/66/ of 27 January 2025 and incoming correspondence No. 67 of 28 January 2025 of the Constitutional Court, together with a letter from the secretary of the Stara Zagora Municipality enclosed to it, outgoing correspondence No. 10-11-1170 of 27 January 2025 to the Central Election Commission; 7) information about missing ballots for the following polling stations: 09th Kardzhali Constituency – 090200015; 27th Stara Zagora Constituency – 270700016, 273600017; 28th Targovishte Constituency – 283500103, to be presented to the Constitutional Court pursuant to ruling dated 21 January 2025 in constitutional case No. 33/2024, together with the opinions enclosed to it of the mayors of the municipalities of Ardino, Galabovo, Chirpan, and Targovishte – a letter from the Central Election Commission, outgoing correspondence No. ЦИК-НС-07-2476/69/ of 28 January 2025 and incoming correspondence No. 69 of 28 January 2025 of the Constitutional Court; 8) information about the outset of voting, the time each vote had been cast, the end of voting in the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 in polling stations Nos 090800006, 090800016, and 090800038 in 09th Kardzhali Constituency and polling stations Nos 321180531 and 321180541 abroad – a letter from the Central Election Commission, outgoing correspondence No. ЦИК-НС-07-2476/80/ of 4 February 2025 and incoming correspondence No. 88 of 5 February 2025 of the Constitutional Court in constitutional case No. 33/2024. The Court admitted the information presented by the Central Election Commission about the results of the check commissioned by Decision No. 3907-НС of 24 October 2024 regarding DG Civil Registration and Administrative Service in the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works and its territorial units and voting at the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 in violation of the rules set forth in the Election Code.
The collected evidence was presented to the applicants for opinion.
The applicants in constitutional cases Nos 34/2024 and 35/2024 submitted their opinions on the subject matter of the case within the time-limit allowed by the Court.
In his opinion of 19 February 2024, the applicant in constitutional case No. 34/2024 objects to the failure of the Constitutional Court to comply with the time-limits for adjudication, thus ‘failing to fulfill its role of supreme guardian of the constitutional order, rule of law and democratic premises as enshrined in the Constitution’. He further objects to ‘[the Constitutional Court’s] refusal to constitute as interested party key institutions and authorities that bear direct relevance to the elections review’, which in turn ‘raises doubts as to the Court’s impartiality and its genuine commitment to the rule of law’. The applicant refers to ‘irregularities in setting up polling stations, which has had an impact on the fairness of the elections’. He describes ‘phantom mobile polling stations and their impact on the legal certainty and stability of the Constitutional Court decision’. He refers to ‘massive illegal replacements in the precinct election commissions in Pleven and their relevance to the annulment of the elections’.
The applicant made 11 specific requests to the Constitutional Court, including ‘complete annulment of the elections in Pleven Constituency due to massive illegal replacements in the precinct election commissions that have interfered with the final election results’; ‘order annulment of the results from the mobile polling stations where unrealistically high voter turnout has been registered, without any proof of compliance of the voters’ characteristics with the requirements in the Election Code’; ‘rule that the substitutes in the precinct election commissions that were appointed contrary to the Election Code and the decisions of the Central Election Commission, in violation of the established rules, are illegal’, hence ‘the decisions of the District Election Commissions should be annulled’, which in turn ‘calls into question the vote counting’ and therefore ‘the elections in these polling sections should be annulled’.
On 26 February 2025 the applicant in constitutional case No. 34/2024 submitted a second opinion, including a report and further clarifications about ‘the calculations and the mathematical model of distorting the machine vote of 27 October 2024’.
On 26 February 2025 the applicant in constitutional case No. 34/2024 submitted a third opinion analysing the evidence admitted by the Court. Based on this analysis, he deems proven the conclusion about ‘inadmissible by law and morals election violations which significantly alter the will of the eligible Bulgarian voters’. He further points out that ‘on the basis of our own data and evidence collected from checks performed in more than 7,000 polling stations, we have established administrative violations in more than 70% of the polling stations and criminal violations in more than 24% of the polling stations. These findings, supported by the data of the experts commissioned by the Constitutional Court, once again confirm the large-scale distortion of the election outcome, hence we categorically declare our constant opinion and insist on overall annulment of the elections held on 27 October 2024’. A total of 10 annexes are enclosed to the opinion: a report on the expert opinions in constitutional case no. 33/2024 г.; a report on established violations and replacement decisions in the context of constitutional case no. 33/2024; a (second) report on established violations and replacement decisions in the context of constitutional case no. 33/2024; a report on missing video monitoring in constitutional case no. 33/2024; a report on the graphological expert assessment in constitutional case no. 33/2024; a report on the verification of evidence in the Constitutional Court upon the request for partial annulment of the elections held on 27 October 2024; a (second) report on the verification of evidence in the Constitutional Court upon the request for partial annulment of the elections held on 27 October 2024; a report on the legality of elections based on the hearing of the expert witnesses in the Constitutional Court; a (third) report on the verification of evidence in the Constitutional Court upon the request for partial annulment of the elections held on 27 October 2024; a (third) report on established violations and replacement decisions in the context of constitutional case no. 33/2024; a (fourth) report on established violations and replacement decisions in the context of constitutional case no. 33/2024.
In his opinion submitted on 25 February 2025 the applicant in constitutional case no. 35/2024 points out that ‘the data from the recount of votes by polling stations has been presented on paper, in table format separately for each polling station, without any summary and concrete findings and conclusions pertaining to the questions referred’. He finds that ‘the lack of summary information and expert witnesses’ conclusions precludes reaching a detailed opinion on the tasks commissioned’. He further states that ‘the Constitutional Court should present complete, accurate and detailed information about the established facts and circumstances, the established violations, their weight, and how each specific violation affects the election outcome’. Further on, the applicant requires, with a view to ‘enhance confidence in the process of recount’, that ‘data from the recount be published in an open, machine processable format, separately for each individual polling station’; that ‘the methodology followed for the recount be published’ and ‘the results be presented in visually comprehensive manner’.
The Constitutional Court, having discussed the arguments and considerations brought up in the requests and subsequent opinions on the evidence, and based on the evidence collected under the case, finds the following:
1. On the arguments pertaining to incorrect exercise of the right to vote due to violations related to the voter lists
In his application of 11 November 2024 and the additional application of 11 December 2024, the applicant in constitutional case no. 34/2024 alleges violations in compiling the voter lists. His arguments relate to the adding of voters in the voter lists abroad on E Day ‘since apparently the number of Bulgarian citizens who turned out to vote during the elections held on 27 October 2024 abroad is many times greater than the number of citizens entered in the voter lists’. Further on, ‘no control has been exercised whatsoever as regards the voting itself, namely in relation to the required applications for voting elsewhere and ruling out double voting at both permanent place of residence and temporary place of residence’. Allegations of violations of Article 264, para 4 EC are maintained in the application of the applicant in constitutional case no. 35/2024.
Pursuant to Article 42, para 1 of the Constitution, every citizen above the age of 18, with the exception of those placed under judicial interdiction or serving a prison sentence, shall be free to elect state authorities, including Members of Parliament. The Bulgarian Constitution does not make Bulgarian citizens’ right to vote for the purpose of electing MPs conditional on residing in the territory of the country as of the day of the respective elections or on residing for a certain period of time in the country before the elections are held. The Constitutional Court has had the opportunity to clarify the meaning of voter lists – entering someone in those lists ‘does not give rise to a right to vote, the latter existing ex constitutione; instead, it legitimizes the citizen as a voter’ and serves as a means to guarantee electoral equality (Decision No. 12/2011 in constitutional case no. 11/2011; Decision No. 3/2017 in constitutional case no. 11/2016).
Part One, Chapter Four ‘Voter Lists’ of the Election Code (EC) regulates in detail the meaning, manner of compilation, admissible corrections and amendments to the voter lists as well as review of making entries in them, while Article 264, para 4 EC expressly sets forth the conditions under which a voter eligible for voting at parliamentary elections but not entered in the voter lists must be entered. The regulation laid down by the legislator of the compilation of voter lists sets forth the different manner for compiling, entering and adding voters in voter lists for the purpose of taking part in elections in the country and abroad – Article 27, para 5 and Article 33, para 2 EC. The Central Election Commission adopted (Decision No. 3794-НС of 4 October 2024 and Decision No. 3849 of 14 October 2024) methodological instructions for the application of the Election Code by precinct election commissions in the country and abroad and clarified in detail (sections 4.3 and 4.4) the conditions under which an additional entry of a voter may be made in the voter list on E Day. The legislator has not made the right to vote conditional on filing a mandatory application to vote under Article 16, para 1 EC by Bulgarian citizens living abroad. Thus, adding Bulgarian citizens eligible to vote to voter lists on E Day is not a violation of the Election Code but a means for these citizens to exercise their right to vote and review the lawful exercise of this right. The Constitutional Court has ruled, albeit in relation to the repealed Election Code, that ‘exercising the right to vote abroad by definition takes place under specific conditions that are laid down as differences in the legal regulation’ and that these differences ‘are meant to guarantee compliance with Article 26, para 1 of the Constitution – that all citizens of the Republic of Bulgaria, irrespective of where they are, shall be vested with all rights and duties under the Constitution’ (Decision No. 4/2011 in constitutional case no. 4/2011).
No evidence of adding persons ineligible to vote or contrary to the conditions for adding entries have been furnished. Further on, the applicant in constitutional case no. 34/2024 points out to polling stations abroad where the number of additionally entered Bulgarian citizens eligible to vote is higher than the number of Bulgarian citizens eligible to vote entered in the voter lists published under the term and procedure of Article 32 EC. This in itself is not an evidence of a violation of the law. In his application the applicant in constitutional case no. 35/2024 does not provide specific data about the alleged violations in adding Bulgarian citizens eligible to vote in the voter lists.
It should be reiterated that the total number of Bulgarian citizens who have filed an application for voting abroad within the time-limit set forth in Article 16, para 2 EC and in line with Decision No. 3786-НС of 4 October 2024 of the Central Election Commission on determining the locations in states where polling stations shall be opened for the elections on 27 October 2024 is 30,689. The number of Bulgarian citizens who voted abroad only in the 47 polling stations checked under task 1 of the commissioned expert assessment is 18,011, while the total number of polling stations abroad is 719. The check performed by DG Civil Registration and Administrative Service with the Ministry of Regional Development and Public Works as commissioned by way of Decision No. 3907-НС of 24 October 2024 of the Central Election Commission has established a total of 10 ineligible to vote persons who voted on 27 October 2024, and a total of 55 persons who voted more than once in the country or abroad. The secrecy of the ballot precludes identifying for which candidate lists these ballots have been cast in order to exclude them in determining the final election outcome.
For the reasons outlined above, the Court finds the applicants’ allegations of violations of the statutory requirements for compiling voter lists and in particular adding entries on E Day unjustified.
2. On arguments pertaining to alleged violations in setting up polling stations
a) alleged violations in setting up polling stations under the general procedure
Voting and vote counting takes place in the polling stations pursuant to Article 8, para 1 EC. Thus, the polling station serves as a basic unit in the electoral process where the right to vote is exercised and the outcome is registered. To ensure equal access to and possibility to peacefully exercise this right, the legislator has established rules for setting up polling stations.
Pursuant to Article 8, para 2 EC, municipality mayors are responsible for setting up the polling stations in the country. The legislator has established the maximum number of voters to be included in a single polling station – up to 1,000 voters, with one exception for territorial agglomerations where the requirement is of no less than 20 voters (Article 9, paras 1 and 3 EC). The term used ‘territorial agglomerations’ has no established legal meaning within the meaning of Article 37, para 1 of Decree No. 883 of 24 April 1974 on the application of the Law on Legal Acts (Decree No. 883) as it is not used in another legal act in force. The Election Code does not contain a definition of the term ‘territorial agglomeration’ in line with the requirements set forth in Article 37, para 2 of Decree No. 883. Likewise, the reasons for adopting the Election Code do not provide any clarification in relation to this term either.
Municipality mayors’ orders for setting up polling stations pursuant to Article 8, para 4 EC may be challenged before the regional governor; their decisions may be challenged before the competent administrative court.
Heads of diplomatic and consular missions are responsible for setting up polling stations abroad pursuant to Article 13, para 1 EC. Polling stations may be set up: in locations where there is a diplomatic or consular mission, or failing this, where at least 40 voters have submitted an application under Article 16, para 1 EC; in locations where during elections held up to five years prior to the E Day there has been at least one polling station set up and at least 100 voters have voted; or upon the discretion of the heads of diplomatic and consular missions on the basis of the total number of filed applications or the total number of voters at the former elections, including where the number of filed applications for a particular location is not less than 40 – Article 14 EC.
The orders of heads of diplomatic and consular missions for setting up polling stations may be challenged before the Central Election Commission; the latter’s decision may be challenged before the Supreme Administrative Court pursuant to Article 13, para 6 EC.
The applicant in constitutional case no. 34/2024 claims that the statutory legal norms pertaining to the setting up of polling stations have not been complied with. He refers to 09th Kardzhali Constituency as a case in point. Indeed, a total of 541 polling stations have been set up in 09th Kardzhali Constituency, which makes this constituency the fifth largest one in terms of number of polling stations set up. According to information publicly accessible on the website of the Central Election Commission, the largest number of polling stations – 742 – have been set up in 02nd Burgas Constituency, followed by 03rd Varna Constituency with 655 polling stations, 23rd Sofia Constituency with 643 polling stations, and 01st Blagoevgrad Constituency with 559 polling stations.
To substantiate his allegations of violations in setting up the polling stations in 09th Kardzhali Constituency, the applicant relies on calculations made on the basis of data from the National Statistical Institute (NSI) about the population of Kardzhali Region as of 31 December 2023. The applicant in constitutional case no. 36/2024 brings up identical arguments although not in relation to a particular region but in general. He points out that ‘the number of voters entered in the voter lists handed over to the precinct election commissions is 6,619,877 while according to data of the NSI the population of the country stood at 6,445,481 at the end of 2023’, which taking into account the number of persons not entitled to vote ‘allows to include in the voter lists the so called ‘dead souls’ that are used to manipulate the elections and distort the election outcome’. No specific data about such violations have been furnished.
Pursuant to Article 23, para 1 EC, voter lists shall be compiled on the basis of the population registers, and Article 24, para 2 EC expressly provides for that voter lists shall be compiled per citizens’ permanent residence address. Any person subject to civil registration, hence every Bulgarian citizen (Article 3, para 2, item 1 of the Civil Registration Act), must declare in writing their permanent address. The permanent address is the address which a person chooses to be registered with in the population register. The permanent address is always located in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria pursuant to Article 93, para 2 of the Civil Registration Act. Pursuant to Article 25, para 1 EC, all Bulgarian citizens eligible to vote in the respective type of elections shall be entered in the voters lists for election of MPs, i.e. all Bulgarian citizens holding a permanent address within the meaning of Article 93, para 1 of the Civil Registration Act, having turned 18 years of age as of the date of elections and falling outside the exceptions under Article 42, para 1 of the Constitution. The National Statistical Institute, in accordance with the methodology established pursuant to Article 2, para 1 of the Statistics Act, uses the term ‘permanent population’ to collectively denote persons residing permanently (having a current address) in the country as of 31 December of any given year and who have not been away from the country for a period longer than a year. Therefore, the data of the National Statistical Institute regarding the population of the Kardzhali region as of 31 December 2023 is not a statutory criterion to determine the number of polling stations. Hence, the applicant’s arguments are unjustified. The population data established at the last census is relevant for determining the number of mandates in the multi-mandate electoral constituencies pursuant to section II.2.1 of the Methodology for determining election results and distribution of mandates in parliamentary elections, annex to Article 248 EC. However, the Constitution does not make Bulgarian citizens’ right to vote in parliamentary elections conditional on a requirement to reside permanently in the country or to have resided for a certain period of time prior to the elections.
Even if it is assumed that have been violations in setting up certain polling stations in some constituencies, no evidence has been furnished as to specific polling stations where those violations occurred, nor as to whether and in what way these violations have affected the outcome of elections. The arguments of the applicant in constitutional case no. 34/2024 concerning undue influence on voters by means of setting up a multitude of polling stations are hypothetical and have not been substantiated by specific evidence; besides, the outcome of voting in specific polling stations that he indicates as a case in point may not in itself stand as a proof of his allegations. Likewise, the applicant does not furnish any evidence of challenging the mayors’ orders for setting up polling stations in any municipality, including in view of the possibilities for review of Bulgarian citizens’ address registration pursuant to Article 99b of the Civil Registration Act, amendments promulgated SG No. 85/2024, which means that the participants in the elections different from the applicants upon whose application constitutional case no. 33/2024 and the joined cases have been initiated have not had an interest in availing of the statutory possibility to challenge the mayors’ orders (Decision No. 12/2011 in constitutional case no. 11/2011).
For the reasons outlined above, the Court finds the applicants’ allegations concerning violation in setting up the polling stations unjustified.
b) violations in setting up mobile polling stations
In his application to the Court the applicant in constitutional case no. 34/2024 points out to four ‘phantom polling stations’ in 12th Montana Constituency. He premises his allegations on the fact that upon checks, those polling stations were not identified at the given address. He refers to polling stations Nos 122999980, 122900081, 122900082, and 122900083. By reference to publicly available information, it appears that by Decision No. 90-НС of 9 October 2024, the Montana District Election Commission, acting upon a notification of the Montana Municipality mayor about 104 applications for voting by means of a mobile polling station, has determined four mobile polling stations in the Montana Municipality. The District Election Commission, by Decision No. 110-НС of 11 October 2024, has determined unique numbers for the four mobile polling stations, namely Nos 122999980, 122900081, 122900082, and 122900083, as well as their scope and address.
In his considerations additionally presented on 11 December 2024, the applicant in constitutional case no. 34/2024 alleges violations during the voting in a mobile polling station. The ‘detailed overview’ presented to the Court about each of mobile polling stations contains information about the number of voters as per voter lists, the number of additionally entered voters, the number of voters who exercised their right to vote, the number of validly cast votes and the respective party/coalition the vote was cast for. However, by itself this overview does not prove any violations in setting up mobile polling stations or voting therein. This information may serve to analyse the election outcome or draw conclusions about the participants in the electoral process, but it does not meet the standard of proof established in the international standards for resolving election disputes that Bulgaria adheres to.
To guarantee that permanently disabled voters who are prevented from exercising their right to vote but nevertheless would like to vote may do so, the legislator has provided for the possibility to vote in a mobile polling station (through a mobile ballot box). Pursuant to Article 37, para 1 EC, to vote in a mobile polling station, it is necessary to apply to this end within the prescribed time-limit, and for the authority under Article 23, para 1 EC – the municipal administration in those agglomerations where a population register is maintained – and the municipality mayor to establish the voter’s condition of a permanent disability preventing them to exercise their right to vote. Article 37, para 3a, item 2 EC lays down the type of document required to verify a permanent disability – a document issued by an expert medical commission (either territorial, or national one). This statutory requirement clearly defines the responsibility of the municipal administration and the mayor for complying with the conditions set forth in the law regarding admitting voting through a mobile ballot box. The mayor’s order for setting up a mobile polling station is publicly announced on the municipality website. The legislator has not specified expressly the possibility to challenge this order but insofar as this is an order for setting up a polling station, i.e. an order identical in character to the mayor’s order under Article 8, para 2 EC and there is no express prohibition in law to the opposite, the terms for challenging it as established in Article 8, para 4 EC apply to it as well.
In addition to the municipality mayor, district election commissions are also responsible for the lawful exercise of the right to vote through a mobile ballot box. Pursuant to Article 72, para 1, item 6 EC, the district election commission sees to the correct setting up of polling sections in the constituency. Further on, in accordance with Article 90, para 1 EC and Decision No. 3795-НС of 4 October 2024 of the Central Election Commission on the terms and procedure for setting up mobile polling stations for voters with permanent disabilities for the parliamentary elections on 27 October 2024, it is the district election commission that determines the number of mobile polling stations based on the applications filed under Article 37 EC. The decision of the District Election Commission (DEC) determining the number and identification numbers of mobile polling stations is subject to appeal before the Central Election Commission pursuant to Article 73, para 1 EC, and CEC decision in turn is subject to appeal before the competent administrative court or the Supreme Administrative Court.
Mobile precinct election commissions shall be appointed by the precinct election commissions pursuant to Article 89, para 2 EC. Appointment of mobile precinct election commissions shall take place following public consultations with the parliamentary represented and non-represented parties. Therefore, similarly to any precinct election commission, the mobile precinct election commission is composed of representatives of different political parties with contradictory interests in the electoral process, which presupposes checks and balances in the course of voting and vote counting. The precinct election commission is formed in the same way – following consultations between parliamentary represented and non-represented parties pursuant to Article 60, para 2 and Article 61, paras 3-9 EC, which should serve as but one further guarantee for not allowing irregularities in setting up mobile polling stations.
As regards voting through a mobile ballot box, the Court has established the following on the basis of the collected documentary evidence:
The total number of mobile polling stations set up in the country is 324, distributed as follows: 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency – 21; 02 Burgas Constituency – 7; 03 Varna Constituency – 11; 04 Veliko Tarnovo Constituency – 6; 05 Vidin Constituency – 16; 06 Vratsa Constituency – 29; 07 Gabrovo Constituency – 3; 08 Dobrich Constituency – 2; 09 Kardzhali Constituency – 40; 10 Kyustendil Constituency – 7; 11 Lovech Constituency – 4; 12 Montana Constituency – 16; 13 Pazardzhik Constituency – 7; 14 Pernik Constituency – 5; 15 Pleven Constituency – 15; 16 Plovdiv Constituency – 3; 17 Plovdiv Constituency – 11; 18 Razgrad Constituency – 30; 19 Ruse Constituency – 7; 20 Silistra Constituency – 10; 21 Sliven Constituency – 1; 22 Smolyan Constituency – 6; 23 Sofia Constituency – 5; 24 Sofia Constituency – 4; 25 Sofia Constituency – 3; 26 Sofia Constituency – 6; 27 Stara Zagora Constituency – 10; 28 Targovishte Constituency – 8; 29 Haskovo Constituency – 11; 30 Shumen Constituency – 16; 31 Yambol Constituency – 4.
The Court checked the ballots in 1,768 polling stations, in 70 of which voters voted through a mobile ballot box distributed as follows:
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in 10 polling stations in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency: 172 voters in polling station 014200026; 146 voters in polling station 014200024; 138 voters in polling station 015300015; 88 voters in polling station 014200023; 87 voters in polling station 015300016; 83 voters in polling station 010200018; 47 voters in polling station 014400027; 41 voters in polling station 013700028; 35 voters in polling station 014400029; 18 voters in polling station 013300089.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in one polling station in 03 Varna Constituency: 031300030 – 21 voters.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in one polling station in 05 Vidin Constituency: 050600014 – 33 voters.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in 27 polling stations in 09 Kardzhali Constituency: 95 voters in polling station 090200050; 93 voters in polling station 093500039; 91 voters in polling station 092100058; 86 voters in polling station 092100060; 73 voters in polling station 092100061; 69 voters in polling station 090200056; 68 voters in polling station 091400078; 64 voters in polling station 90200051; 48 voters in polling station 093500040; 47 voters in polling station 091400080; 46 voters in polling station 090200054; 45 voters in polling station 091500085; 45 voters in polling station 093500041; 43 voters in polling station 092100062; 41 voters in polling station 090200058; 40 voters in polling station 091500082; 40 voters in polling station 091500086; 36 voters in polling station 090200052; 36 voters in polling station 090800045; 36 voters in polling station 091400077; 35 voters in polling station 091500083; 32 voters in polling station 090200055; 32 voters in polling station 091600163; 30 voters in polling station 090200057; 28 voters in polling station 091500081; 27 voters in polling station 091500084; 26 voters in polling station 090200053.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in one polling station in 10 Kyustendil Constituency: 104100010 – 20 voters.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in three polling stations in 12 Montana Constituency: 32 voters in polling station 120700013; 22 voters in polling station 120700016; 15 voters in polling station 121400014.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in two polling stations in 13 Pazardzhik Constituency: 271 voters in polling station 133900006; 41 voters in polling station 130300010.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in two polling stations in 14 Pernik Constituency: 16 voters in polling station 141000022; 11 voters in polling station 143200052.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in 14 polling stations in 18 Pazardzhik Constituency: 98 voters in polling station 182900025; 97 voters in polling station 183600010; 77 voters in polling station 181100015; 42 voters in polling station 182900019; 41 voters in polling station 18360011; 35 voters in polling station 182900018; 31 voters in polling station 182900024; 28 voters in polling station 182900022; 20 voters in polling station 182900017; 19 voters in polling station 182900020; 16 voters in polling station 181600038; 16 voters in polling station 182900021; 15 voters in polling station 181700021; 15 voters in polling station 182900023.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in two polling stations in 19 Ruse Constituency: 85 voters in polling station 190500022; 85 voters in polling station 190500023.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in two polling stations in 20 Silistra Constituency: 133 voters in polling station 200700326; 9 voters in polling station 203200614.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in three polling stations in 22 Smolyan Constituency: 77 voters in polling station 221600035; 30 voters in polling station 220500009; 19 voters in polling station 220200016.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in two polling stations in 26 Sofia Constituency: 40 voters in polling station 265900008; 28 voters in polling station 262500020.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in one polling station in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency: 17 voters in polling station 272400023.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in four polling stations in 28 Targovishte Constituency: 53 voters in polling station 282300012; 26 voters in polling station 282200055; 24 voters in polling station 282200056; 18 voters in polling station 282200054.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in three polling stations in 29 Haskovo Constituency: 57 voters in polling station 293400151; 36 voters in polling station 293000030;. 28 voters in polling station 291100027.
Voters voted through a mobile ballot box in two polling stations in 30 Shumen Constituency: 152 voters in polling station 301000021; 124 voters in polling station 300700016.
The results established by the Court as regards the voting through a mobile ballot box in some polling stations indeed raise the question of the objective possibility for voters to exercise their right to vote in line with the constitutional principles of equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. They further raise the question of freedom in exercising this right. The Constitutional Court has had the opportunity to point out that ‘viewing the right to vote in isolation from the other political rights enshrined in the Constitution such as freedom of thought and belief and freedom of speech and expression leads to negative results’; in addition, ‘the close correlation between the right to vote and the other political rights justifies the necessity to observe the required freedom of elections’ (Decision No. 3/2017 гin constitutional case no. 11/2016).
Voting through a mobile ballot box is but an exception and as such should be made recourse to only insofar as the respective preconditions are satisfied. Through the composition of the mobile precinct election commission, which is established following consultations with parliamentary and non-parliamentary represented parties, the legislator has in principle envisaged a guarantee against possible abuse of the right to vote by means of a mobile ballot box. None of the evidence under the case refers to disagreements established in accordance with the statutory procedure by any political party represented on those commissions with the manner elections have proceeded or votes have been counted. There is a single ‘objection by a representative of political party […]’ registered in the protocol of the precinct election commission in polling station no. 133900006 which conducted the voting of 271 voters through a mobile ballot box. However, none of the evidence indicates the subject of that objection, whether it has the nature of a complaint that has been reviewed by the competent authority, or the result thereof, even though the objection has been raised by a representative of a political party whose MPs have seized the Court with a request seeking to establish illegality of the elections. Further on, none of the evidence under the case refers to instances of challenging the acts for setting up mobile polling stations, including those where voting by 271, 172, 138 or 98 voters has been conducted (for example, Decision No. 118-НС of 18 October 2024 of the Pazardzhik District Election Commission for establishing mobile polling stations in the territory of 13 Pazardzhik Constituency).
Whatever doubts may be harboured about the hypothetical possibility that in the course of the E Day from 7 am to 8 pm pursuant to Article 220, para EC 271 or 172 voters have exercised their right to vote by a mobile ballot box not in compliance with the constitutional principles, this in itself is not a ground to declare the vote cast by all these 271 or 172 voters invalid. To declare a vote cast invalid, the Court relies not on doubts or suspicions but on evidence on the basis of which it may draw up a justified conclusion of a violation that in turn leads to invalidity of the vote cast. The fact that 95.2% of the 271 votes cast by a mobile ballot box or respectively 97.7% of the 172 votes cast by a mobile ballot box are for the same party also cannot by itself stand as evidence for the invalidity of all votes cast by a mobile ballot box. All votes cast are equal and secret, and the Court cannot establish which of those 271 or 172 voters has exercised their right to vote in a manner that warrants their vote invalidity for breaching the principles governing the exercise of this right, so as to declare the election outcome in these polling stations does not correspond to the voters’ will expressed through the voting (Decision No. 2/2010 in constitutional case no. 10/2009; Decision No. 13/2013 in constitutional case no. 14/2013).
The precinct election commission serves as a barrier to a possible abuse of voting through a mobile ballot box since, as stated above, it is composed of members nominated by different political parties with contrary interests in the electoral process, hence a system of checks and balances should be in place in the course of voting and vote counting to guarantee that every voter exercises their right to vote in line with the constitutional requirements. To maintain the opposite would be tantamount to a rejection by the participating political parties of their constitutional raîson d’être, namely to enhance the formation and expression of citizens’ political will and contribute to the political pluralism in the country – Article 11, paras 1 and 4 of the Constitution.
For the reasons outlines above, the Court finds that, although some cases of voting by a mobile ballot box give rise to doubts as to whether the registered voters have exercised their right to vote by a mobile ballot box in compliance with the constitutional principles, this fact in itself does not suffice to declare invalidity of all votes cast by a mobile ballot box. The secrecy of the ballot prevents the Court from establishing invalid some of the votes cast.
As stated above, in the review of legality the Constitutional Court carries out not all violations may stand to proof. Violations such as those related to voting through a mobile ballot box must be established during elections preparation, and the Election Code provides for specific legal means to that end. In the alternative, such violations must be established while the right to vote is being exercised in order to eliminate the legal consequences of the violation, namely to declare the vote cast invalid. The Constitutional Court has applied this understanding in its case-law and currently it finds no reason to depart from it (Decision No. 2/2010 in constitutional case no. 10/2009). Making timely recourse to the existing statutory means of legal review in the framework of the electoral process creates an environment for lawful conduct of elections and thus guarantees that citizens shall exercise their right to vote in compliance with the Constitution
3. Regarding the arguments pertaining to violations related to the composition of the precinct election commissions
The precinct election commissions are the core of the election administration. It is precisely the precinct election commissions that are largely responsible for the free and peaceful exercise of the right to vote and the correct and transparent vote counting, which in turn guarantees confidence in the electoral process and respect for the results achieved thereof. This requires the members of the precinct election commissions to be independent and impartial in carrying out the tasks assigned to them.
The legislator has not established specific requirements for the persons who may be appointed members of the precinct election commissions. The only requirement is their eligibility to vote in the respective type of elections, i.e. to be Bulgarian citizens who are entitled to vote and have a good command of the Bulgarian language pursuant to Article 95 EC. Taking into account the significance and responsibility of the members of precinct election commissions and the time required for them to get acquainted with their powers and organize their work, the legislator has provided that they shall be appointed not later than 25 days prior to the E Day. This period of time allows, according to the legislator, for the members of precinct election commissions to get prepared, including receive training provided by the District Election Commissions.
The legislator has set forth (Article 91 EC) a detailed procedure for consultations between parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties to establish the composition of the precinct election commissions such as to guarantee their representation. However, the fact that the political parties nominate members of the precinct election commissions does not discharge the appointed members from the obligation of independence and impartiality in carrying out the tasks assigned to them because with their appointment as members of a precinct election commission they accept to exercise public authority entrusted upon them by law. This is what gives the precinct election commission the characteristics of a public authority – it has certain powers laid down in the law and in the course of exercising its powers it issues legal acts. Pursuant to an express legal provision (Article 93, para 2 EC), in the execution of their powers the members of precinct election commissions shall have the capacity of officials within the meaning of the Criminal Code; their health and social insurance shall be covered by the state budget.
The Constitutional Court has ruled, albeit in relation to members of the Central Election Commission (CEC), that ‘[t]he possibility for a political force to recall from the Central Election Commission a member it has nominated places that member in a situation of uncertainty and dependency from the party headquarters. The authority of a CEC member does not stem from the political force that has nominated him but from being a member of an independent national body with public responsibilities and functions. It is worth underscoring that once CEC members have been appointed, they sever the connection of dependency from their party nominators and become members of an independent and neutral central body responsible for the overall conduct of elections’ (Decision No. 4/2011 in constitutional case no. 4/2011).
Although the precinct election commission is not a ‘central body responsible for the overall conduct of elections’, it is the body responsible for conducting the elections in the framework of the polling station. Hence, the Court’s finding in relation to the Central Election Commission applies to the precinct election commission as well. It is precisely the precinct election commissions which in their entirety (12,920 in the challenged elections) are the bodies responsible for guaranteeing that the right to vote of each Bulgarian national will be exercised in a manner that correctly translates the declaration of intention of every Bulgarian citizen into public authority.
However, the legislator has not laid down in clear and detailed terms the grounds for replacing members of precinct election commissions once they have been appointed. Laying down the powers of the District Election Commission, the legislator has specified in Article 72, para 1, item 5 EC that the District Election Commission shall dismiss members of precinct election commissions in the respective constituency in two situations: 1) in case of violations of the election legislation (the Election Code; decisions of the Central Election Commission; decisions of the District Election Commission); and 2) in case any of the circumstances referred to in Article 51, para 2 EC occurs. Article 51, para 2 EC lays down the grounds for terminating the powers of a member of the Central Election Commission. These are: 1) resignation; 2) entry into force of a custodial sentence; 3) incapacity mandate; 4) permanent incapacity to perform official duties for more than six months; 5) incompatibility; 6) failure to attend for no good reasons three consecutive or five meetings in total throughout the year where the fact is established following terms and procedures set by the Commission; 7) entry into force of an act establishing a conflict of interest under the Conflict of Interest Prevention and Disclosure Act (repealed, SG No. 7/2018); 8) death.
It is easy to establish the lack of correspondence of these grounds for dismissing a member of the Central Election Commission with the legal status of a member of the precinct election commission, the length of period during which he exercises public authority, and even the life situations that could require his replacement. Yet, this fact in itself does not suffice to justify replacement at any time of members of precinct election commissions by the District Election Commissions or the Central Election Commission upon requests of the parties that have nominated these members, without any reasonable grounds. Further on, it is completely inadmissible for these bodies to have contradictory case-law on the application of Article 72, para 1, item 5 EC.
The Constitutional Court may not carry out a review of legality of the decisions of the Central Election Commission and the District Election Commissions whereby replacements of members of precinct election commissions have been effected since these decisions are administrative acts that could have been challenged but failing this, they have entered into force and have produced their legal effect. Yet, the multiple replacements made are symptomatic of a problem in the organization of the electoral process that could potentially affect negatively the election outcome.
The analysis of the documentary evidence furnished by the Central Election Commission indicates that the District Election Commissions made replacements of members of the precinct election commissions only upon requests made by the political parties that had nominated the respective members. The decisions do not specify any factual or legal grounds for the replacements made. Reference to Article 72, para 1, item 4 or 5 or Article 89 EC as a legal basis for the replacement made may not serve as a reference to a proper legal basis since these provisions establish powers of the dismissing body but not grounds for dismissal. Further on, there is no evidence for the replacements made.
Of all 10,479 replacements made in the period from 21 to 26 October 2024 for which evidence has been furnished under the case, only 22 replacement decisions refer to the replaced member’s health condition as a ground for dismissing the respective member of the precinct election commission; 19 replacement decisions refer to impossibility to attend meetings, 66 decisions for replacement on E Day refer to Article 229, paras 2, 3, and 4 EC as a legal ground for the replacement made (failure to show up on E Day); 13 refer to Article 62, para 2 of the Code of Administrative Procedure (correction of a manifest error). For all other replacements the District Election Commissions have referred to Article 72, para 1, items 4 and 5 and/or Article 89 EC as a ground for the replacement. The District Election Commission in 15 Pleven Constituency has referred to Article 105 EC, which is a legal basis for making changes in precinct election commissions in constituencies abroad. The applicant in constitutional case no. 34/2024 has referred to this latter fact to substantiate his claim that this had turned the precinct election commissions in 15 Pleven Constituency into precinct election commissions abroad. Reference to Article 105 EC as a ground for dismissing a member of the precinct election commission does not change the legal status of that commission, yet it is an illustration of the level of competency of the respective body.
The review of the grounds for changing members of precinct election commissions shows a genuine problem in the organization of the electoral process. A large part of the replacements made are most probably the result of the split that occurred in the course of the preparation of elections in one of the political parties taking part in the elections. Yet this only serves to highlight a legislative gap that allows political parties to carry out at any time and without any justification changes in the precinct election commissions making their members directly dependent on the party nominators, which does not enhance the confidence in the election administration or the electoral process for that matter.
The check of the documentary evidence furnished by the Central Election Commission shows that in the period 21-26 October 2024 most changes in the composition of the precinct election commissions were made in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency – a total of 1,524 changes, i.e. almost 37% of the members of precinct election commissions were replaced. A total of 317 members of precinct election commissions were replaced on 21 October 2024 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency, 108 on 22 October 2024, 204 on 23 October 2024, 66 on 24 October 2024, 156 on 25 October 2024, and 30 on 26 October 2024, that is 881 members or 19% of the composition of the precinct election commissions was replaced over the six days prior to E Day. A total of 534 changes or 12.6% of the composition of the precinct election commissions were made in 09 Kardzhali Constituency in the period 21-26 October 2024; yet another 606 changes were made in the period 14-20 October 2024. More than 10% of the composition of the precinct election commissions was changed in 29 Haskovo and 30 Shumen Constituencies, just like in other constituencies in the country over the period 21-27 October 2024.
These multiple changes of members of the precinct election commissions, especially in the period 21-26 October 2024, became public and were largely covered by the media, thus creating an environment that hardly contributed to preserving confidence in the electoral process or motivating citizens to actively exercise their right to vote. Likewise, massive changes of members of the precinct election commissions were observed during the early parliamentary elections held on 9 June 2024, only four months earlier, yet this did not motivate the legislator or the Central Election Commission to take any action to terminate the unjustified multiple changes of members of precinct election commissions, despite the conclusion made by the Central Election Commission itself that the mass changes had been at the root of the many wrong protocols. Decision No. 3971-НС of 30 October 2024 of the Central Election Commission approving the analysis of discrepancies further supports the conclusion that the multiple and unjustified changes of members of precinct election commissions affect negatively the quality of work of the election administration. This decision reveals that a discrepancy of one type or another has been established in 1,272 precinct election commission protocols or 9.86% of all protocols, amounting to 3,829 discrepancies or three discrepancies in each of the 1,272 protocols on the average. The findings of the Court as regards the infringements committed by the precinct election commissions in drawing up protocols and preserving the ballots are a further case in point.
The circumstances around the precinct election commissions forced the Central Election Commission to issue at its meeting on 26 October 2024, 13hrs00, instructions to the District Election Commissions to suspend the adoption of decisions approving replacements in the precinct election commissions upon requests of the political parties and coalitions; replacements were only allowed pursuant to Article 91, para 5 in conjunction with Article 51, para 2 EC. These late instructions could not eliminate the legal consequences of the multiple replacements already effected, or the involvement in precinct election commissions of persons who had not undergone a training and were not acquainted with the statutory requirements for conducting elections. The State has a duty to guarantee that the persons conducting the elections, what is more – those who are called to guarantee the free and fair vote of every citizen, are duly trained and sufficiently competent because they are the ones who secure the trust in the electoral process.
The multiple and unjustified replacements of members of the precinct election commissions undermine the confidence in the electoral process.
4. Regarding the arguments pertaining to violations related to drawing up the protocols of the precinct election commissions and the storage of ballots
The applicants in constitutional cases nos. 34/2024 and 36/2024 consider the election outcome illegal inter alia due to violations in drawing up the protocols of the precinct election commissions. The protocols of the precinct election commissions, together with the ballots, are the only tangible media established by law that reflect the will of the citizens expressed through voting. Pursuant to Article 273, para 1 EC, the precinct election commission shall establish the results of the voting by paper ballots and the machine vote ballots and shall draw up a protocol. The protocol of the precinct election commission is in three identical copies; it is made of three-sheet carbonless copy paper and is protected with polygraphic protection that guarantees the identity of the information and allows comparison of entered data.
The legislator has laid down specific requirements for drawing up the protocol of the precinct election commission: it shall be signed by all members of the precinct election commission; correction in the protocol shall be made before announcing the result of the voting; corrections shall be signed by all members of the commission, with a marginal note ‘correction’ (Article 282, paras 1, 2, and 3 EC). A copy of the signed protocol shall be presented to the persons referred to in Article 283 EC. The copy for the District Election Commission and the Central Election Commission shall be delivered by the persons referred to in Article 285, para 1 EC.
These statutory requirements guarantee that what has been entered in the protocol corresponds to the result of the voting in the respective precinct as established by the precinct election commission. They further on rule out any undue corrections.
Given the arguments brought up by some of the applicants, one of the tasks of the expert assessment made in relation to the check of the ballots in 1,786 polling stations, was to check whether the protocol of the precinct election commission under Article 273 EC has been drawn up in accordance with the requirements set forth in Article 274, para 3 EC. The experts have not established any protocols under Article 274, para 1 EC that replace incorrect protocols under Article 273 EC. However, insofar as the requirements for correcting an error in incorrect protocols and in protocols under Article 273, para 1 EC set forth respectively in Article 274, para 3 and Article 282, para 2 EC are identical, the experts checked whether the requirements for making corrections in the protocols have been observed, namely signing the correction by all members of the precinct election commission and entering the word ‘correction’ in the margin of the protocol. The check covers data entered in the protocol save for the preferential vote.
The experts’ findings warrant a conclusion that a significant part of the protocols of the precinct election commissions have been drawn up in compliance with the requirements set forth in Article 282, para 2 EC. The experts have not established any violations of the statutory requirements as regards making corrections in the protocols of the checked polling stations in 04 Veliko Tarnovo, 05 Vidin, 07 Gabrovo, 08 Dobrich, 11 Lovech, 14 Pernik, and 22 Smolyan Constituencies. The expert assessment has established one protocol drawn up in deviation from the requirements in each of 10 Kyustendil, 12 Montana, 24 Sofia, and 25 Sofia Constituencies. Deviations from the requirements have been further on established in 6 protocols in 02 Burgas Constituency, and 8 protocols in 03 Varna Constituency. The established percentage of protocols drawn up not in compliance with the requirements varies from 13% to 20% for 17 Plovdiv, 18 Razgrad, 28 Targovishte, 29 Haskovo, 30 Shumen, and 31 Yambol Constituencies.
However, the results from the checked polling stations in other constituencies differ.
The percentage of protocols not in compliance with the respective statutory requirements is 24% for 13 Pazardzhik Constituency; almost 30% for 01 Blagoevgrad and 15 Pleven Constituencies; almost 32% for 16 Plovdiv and 20 Silistra Constituencies; and 35% for 23 Sofia Constituency.
The expert assessment checked the ballots from 20 polling stations in 21 Sliven Constituency. In 8 of these, i.e. 40% it established corrections in the protocols without any signatures or only with three signatures. The expert assessment checked the ballots from 119 polling stations in 09 Kardzhali Constituency and established 49 protocols or 41,2% drawn up in violation of the statutory requirement for signing corrections in the protocols by all members of the precinct election commission. The expert assessment in 19 Ruse Constituency checked the ballots of 68 polling stations and established 31 protocols or 45.6% with corrections verified by three signatures or no signatures at all. In 33 or 45.2% of the checked 73 protocols in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency the expert assessment established a violation of Article 282, para 3 EC – corrections without any signatures, or with only two or three signatures.
The assessment of the findings as regards compliance of the protocols of the precinct election commissions with the statutory requirements must further on take account of the fact that pursuant to Article 287, para 5 EC when the District Election Commission establishes manifest errors of fact in the protocols, these errors shall be noted and signed by the members of the precinct election commission referred to in Article 285, para 1 EC, i.e. the chairperson or the deputy chairperson, the secretary and a member of the precinct electoral commission who deliver the protocols to the District Election Commission, which means three signatures. Failure by the precinct election commission to comply with the requirement under Article 282, para 2 EC as regards verifying corrections in the protocol by the signatures of all members of the precinct election commission does not allow to distinguish corrections made prior to announcing the election results by the precinct election commission from corrections made upon delivery of the protocol to the District Election Commission. Clarity as regards the exact moment of making corrections in the protocol of the precinct election commission is important for guaranteeing transparency in the work of the precinct election commission and confidence in the results established by it.
Considering the scope of the checked protocols and taking account of the fact that the check covered paper ballots, machine vote ballots and results entered in the protocols of the precinct election commissions, meaning eliminating the effect of possible errors in making corrections, and bearing in mind that the review of legality of the challenged election results had to be completed in reasonable time, the Court has not assessed how many of the corrections verified with three signatures are in compliance with the requirement under Article 287, para 5 EC, namely corrections of manifest errors of fact.
Presenting their expert assessment, the experts were unanimous that it was extremely rarely that they had established compliance with the statutory requirement of entering the word ‘correction’ in the margins of corrected protocols of precinct election commissions. Failure to comply with this requirement does not invalidate the protocol, yet this is a means established by law to clearly mark the moment when a correction is made – prior to announcing the election results – hence complying with this requirement bears relevance to the transparency and confidence in the protocol drawn up by the commission that verifies the election result.
The experts further on informed the Court of their findings in the course of performing the check as regards compliance by the precinct election commissions with Article 284 EC and the Methodological Instructions of the Central Election Commission concerning packaging of ballots and other election papers. The experts established that a considerable number of precinct election commissions complied with the regulations. The experts established the following violations of the requirements concerning packaging and storing of election papers: lack of adhesive paper tape with the signatures of the members and seal of the precinct election commission (polling stations in 03 Varna Constituency, 06 Vratsa Constituency, 23 Sofia Constituency, 24 Sofia Constituency, 30 Shumen Constituency); lack of the final report of the machine vote (polling stations in 19 Ruse Constituency, 20 Silistra Constituency, 21 Sliven Constituency, 24 Sofia Constituency, 29 Haskovo Constituency); lack of counterfoils; wrongly or no packed ballots.
Serious deviations of the generally established good condition of the election papers was found in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency where the requirements of Article 284 EC and the Methodological Instructions of the Central Election Commission were not complied with.
Failure to comply with Article 284 EC and the Methodological Instructions of the Central Election Commission as regards packing and storing of ballots and other election papers and delivery to the municipal administration, and the manner in which the municipal administration stores election papers may appear not directly relevant to the election results. Yet this is important in relation to the control exercised over the electoral process and the current proceedings are an undeniable illustration of this fact.
A comparison between the constituencies where the most changes in the composition of the precinct election commissions were made in the week preceding the elections, and the constituencies where the highest number of protocols not in compliance with the requirements set forth in Article 282, para 2 and Article 274, para 3 EC were found and where the most instances of not complying with the Methodological Instructions of the Central Election Commission as regards packing and storing of ballots and other election papers occurred clearly demonstrates the relation between these two facts.
The findings as regards compliance by the precinct election commissions with the statutory requirements concerning verifying corrections in the protocols by the signature of every member of the precinct election commission and the word ‘correction’ entered in the margins of the protocol bears no relevance to the election results as established by the Court by checking the ballots. Yet compliance with these statutory requirements bears relevance to the transparency and confidence in the electoral process. The requirements for verifying corrections made in the protocol by the signatures of all members of the commission not only allows for the possibility to present a copy of the protocol signed by all members of the precinct election commission to the persons referred to in Article 283 EC before delivering it to the District Election Commission, but it serves as an instrument of check and balances and a guarantee of the objective work of the precinct election commission. While these violations bear no direct relevance to the election outcome, they are relevant to the transparency and confidence in the electoral process.
5. Regarding violations of Article 272 EC
One of the main arguments of all applicants in the initiated constitutional cases challenging the legality of the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 pertains to violations of Article 272 EC by the precinct election commissions. Article 272 EC provides for the right of persons who are not members of the precinct election commission to be present at the polling site during the opening of the boxes and establishing the results of the voting. The precinct election commission shall ensure direct visibility to the persons referred to in Article 272 EC, including by means of ‘video recording or real-time video broadcasting in compliance with the requirements for personal data protection during the counting of votes’.
Video recording or real-time video broadcasting in compliance with the requirements for personal data protection during the counting of votes has been envisaged by the legislator by the Law amending and supplementing the Election Code (promulgated SG No. 36/2021). A new item 34 was introduced in Article 57, para 1 EC by the same Law. It authorises the Central Election Commission to ‘lay down the terms and procedure for video surveillance of the counting of votes in the precinct election commissions’. The Law amending and supplementing the Election Code (promulgated SG No. 104/2022) makes amendments to the wording of Article 57, para 1, item 34, providing that the Central Election Commission is authorized to ‘lay down the terms and procedure, in compliance with the requirements for personal data protection, for real-time video surveillance and video recording of the counting of votes and drawing up the of the protocols in the precinct election commissions after declaring the closure of the E Day’. The legislator has failed to harmonise this amendment of Article 57, para 1, item 34 EC with the provision of Article 272 EC, hence currently both ‘video recording or video broadcasting’ and ‘real-time video surveillance and video recording’ are present in the Election Code.
The legislator’s basic reasons for amending Article 272 EC in 2021 were that ‘the sensitivity of all participants in the elections as regards the accurate counting of votes as well as the decisions of the Central Election Commission require mechanisms to ensure transparency through direct visibility during the counting of votes, including by means of video recording or video broadcast. These reasons stem from the practice established over the years of abusing the term ‘direct visibility’ […] The requirement for direct visibility is meant to ensure that the persons are standing at such a distance that allows them to observe unimpeded (i.e. physically to see by naked eye) the counting of every ballot and the determining of every vote cast as valid or invalid. This requirement guarantees public and transparent electoral process in view of the lacking online meetings of the precinct election commissions’.
Real-time video surveillance and video recording in the precinct election commissions during the counting of votes and drawing up the protocols after announcing the closure of the E Day bear no relevance to the validity or invalidity of the vote – it is not included in the set of requirements under Article 282, para 2 or Article 282, para 3 EC. Thus, failure of the precinct election commission to comply with the obligation under Article 272 or complying in such a manner that does not attain the objective of ensuring direct visibility during the counting of votes is not in itself a ground to declare the election results invalid.
However, the lack of direct legal consequences provided for in the law of the failure to ensure real-time video surveillance and video recording during the counting of the votes and drawing up of the protocols after announcing the closure of the E Day does not make it irrelevant to the electoral process. It was precisely the lack of or non-compliant with the objective of the law real-time video surveillance and video recording in certain polling stations that became public immediately after the challenged elections, brought public discontent and gave rise to doubts as to the fairness of the counting of votes in these polling stations. At the same time, it was the real-time video surveillance and video recording that made public the incorrect counting of votes cast for certain parties and in particular political party Velichie, which served as the main ground to challenge the elections.
The information received from the Central Election Commission reveals that there was no real-time video surveillance and video recording in a total of 43 polling stations in the country: 20 in 09 Kardzhali Constituency, 7 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency, 3 in 26 Sofia Constituency, 1 in each of 02 Burgas, 05 Vidin, 12 Montana, 13 Pazardzhik, 14 Pernik, 16 Plovdiv, 18 razgrad, 19 Ruse, 20 Silistra, 24 Sofia, 28 Targovishte, 29 Haskovo, and 31 Yambol Constituencies, the reason being that the devices were either not switched on or had not been activated. Therefore, the lacking video surveillance and video recording was due to actions (or omissions) of members of the precinct election commissions.
The election papers of all of these polling stations were the object of checks by the Court that has established the following.
A single invalid vote cast by a paper ballot has been registered as valid for one candidate list in polling station 090200013 in 09 Kardzhali Constituency. Two of the ‘I do not support anyone’ machine votes registered in polling station 090800010 as valid are on defective ballots since the voter’s choice cannot be established on the printed ballot. Three invalid votes are registered as valid for one candidate list in polling station 090800032. Four invalid votes cast by paper ballots are registered as valid for two political parties – three votes and one vote respectively – in polling station 091600105. One invalid vote cast by paper ballot is registered as valid for one candidate list in polling station 091600140. One invalid vote is registered as valid for one candidate list in polling station 093500025. No differences from what has been entered in the protocols have been established in the remaining 13 polling stations in 09 Kardzhali Constituency. One polling station has not been subject to the check performed in the framework of the expert assessment.
No differences from what has been entered in the protocols by the precinct election commissions have been established in four of the 7 polling stations in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency. The of the votes ‘I do not support anyone’ cast by paper ballots and registered as valid in polling station 014200006 are in fact invalid. One vote cast for one candidate list in polling station and registered as valid is in fact invalid. Fifteen invalid votes cast by paper ballots for two candidate lists in polling station 014200014 have been registered as valid, respectively 14 votes and 1 vote per candidate list. In addition, the number of machine vote ballots appeared to be less by two compared to what has been entered in the protocol.
One invalid vote cast by paper ballot for one candidate list has been registered as valid in polling station 123600007 in 12 Montana Constituency. Two invalid votes cast by paper ballots in polling station 182600050 in 18 Razgrad Constituency have been registered as valid for two candidate lists, one machine vote ballot has not been counted. One vote registered as invalid in polling station 192700069 in 19 Ruse Constituency appears to be valid for one specific candidate list, and one machine vote ballot has not been counted. Two invalid votes cast by paper ballots in polling station 263900055 in 26 Sofia Constituency have been registered as valid for two candidate lists. One valid vote ‘I do not support anyone’ cast by paper ballot in polling station 292800033 in 29 Haskovo Constituency has been registered as invalid, while one valid vote ‘I do not support anyone’ has been registered as valid for a candidate list.
No differences from what has been entered in the protocols by the precinct election commissions have been established in the polling stations in 02 Burgas, 05 Vidin, 13 Pazardzhik, 14 Pernik, 16 Plovdiv, 20 Silistra, 24 Sofia, 28 Targovishte, 31 Yambol Constituencies and two of the polling stations in 26 Sofia Constituency.
It appears from the documentary evidence presented by the Central Election Commission that a deficiency has been established in the video recording device in 5 polling stations, and an error in the functioning of the video broadcasting device in another 5 ones.
The legal regulation of real-time video surveillance and video recording, as well as the findings of the checks performed of the election papers in the polling stations where no real-time video surveillance and video recording was carried out due to omissions of members of the precinct election commissions do not support the arguments of the applicants alleging illegality of the election results in these polling stations due to lack of video surveillance. The same applies to their arguments pertaining to illegality of the election results in those polling stations where real-time video surveillance and video recording was not carried out in compliance with the law as it failed to ensure unimpeded and direct observation of the vote counting and drawing up of commission protocols. As regards correspondence between the data entered in the protocols of these precinct election commissions and the findings of the check of election papers performed by the Court, the results have been noted for each polling station and will be reflected in the final election outcome.
However, the above stated does not warrant a conclusion that failure on the part of members of the precinct election commission to comply or to comply fully with the obligation to ensure real-time video surveillance and video recording during the counting of votes and drawing up of protocols after closure of the E Day is not relevant to the electoral process. The arguments brought by the applicants in all constitutional cases reveal that precisely the failure to comply or to fully comply with the statutory requirement to ensure real-time video surveillance and video recording give rise to or enhance the mistrust in the electoral process. Video surveillance and video recording bring transparency to and builds trust in the process of vote counting and entering the election result from the respective polling station in the protocol. Real-time video surveillance and video recording is neither complicated nor troublesome, nor does it burden the work of the precinct election commission members. Yet it has the great potential when conducted in compliance with the statutory requirements to make the electoral process transparent and thus enhance confidence in it.
Citizens’ strong mistrust in the electoral process in recent years reflected in the low turnout renders real-time video surveillance and video recording an important instrument for effective public control of the electoral process, in particular vote counting and registering the results. This is why as long as real-time video surveillance and video recording are not performed or are not performed in a manner that allows to observe the counting of every single ballot and determining every single vote cast as valid or invalid, the tendency to challenge in any possible way the election results will grow, and this affects directly the legitimacy of the elected public authority. Real-time video surveillance and video recording make vote counting transparent, and this reflects directly on the legitimacy of the elected representative authority. Thus, the parties as participants in the electoral process should be interested in strengthening this instrument.
In view of the significance that real-time video surveillance and video recording holds for enhancing confidence in the electoral process, there is no logical explanation for the amendment made to Article 57, para 1, item 4 EC by way of the Law amending and supplementing the Election Code (promulgated SG No. 104/2022) whereby voting through a mobile ballot box in hospitals, nursing homes for elderly people and other specialized social services establishments is excluded from the scope of real-time video surveillance and video recording. The legislator has not provided any reasons for this amendment. The proposal for the amendment was made by MPs between the first and second reading of the draft law amending and supplementing the Election Code. The fact that a polling station is designed for voting through a mobile ballot box does not mean that it lacks a specific address as determined by a decision of the District Election Commission where the ballot box must be opened and the votes cast must be counted. The fact that the polling station has been opened in a hospital, a nursing home for elderly people or another specialized social services establishment does not mean that the members of the precinct election commission perform the opening of the ballot box and the counting of votes in the hospital or the premises of the specialized social services establishments where the persons placed in. Each of these precinct election commissions must open the ballot box and count the votes in accordance with Articles 270-285 EC, which means that there are no obstacles to real-time video surveillance and video recording of these activities in the precinct election commission after announcing the closure of the E Day.
For the consideration stated above, the Court finds the applicants’ arguments for illegality of the election results due to failure to comply or to fully comply with the statutory requirement to ensure real-time video surveillance and video recording unjustified. At the same time the Court expressly underlines its great significance for the transparency and fairness of the electoral process and hence the confidence in it.
6. Regarding the arguments concerning violations in the precinct election commissions establishing the election results
а) as per paper ballots
The applicants seeking to establish illegality of the 51st National Assembly elections in the five initiated constitutional cases allege violations related to inaccuracies in determining the election results due to: ‘interference with the paper ballots during vote counting’, ‘inaccurately counting or registering validly cast votes’, entering votes cast for one party as such cast for another party, determining ‘unlawfully valid and invalid ballots contrary to Article 278, para 2, item 7 and para 3, item 6, second indent EC, ‘discrepancies between the actually cast votes for parties or coalitions and the numbers recorded in the protocols’ of the precinct election commissions. All applicants refer to specific polling stations.
The Court conducted a check of the applicants’ allegations concerning violations in determining the vote cast by voters by paper ballots by assigning expert assessments of the elections papers of certain polling stations designated by the Court on the basis of the applicants’ requests.
The expert assessment under task 1 as regards the paper ballots concerned counting the votes cast by paper ballot in each of the designated polling station and establish whether the number of validly cast votes per candidate list (parties, coalitions, independent candidates) corresponds to the entry made in the protocol of the respective precinct election commission. To answer that question, the experts established for each polling station the number of paper ballots, the number of invalidly cast votes by paper ballot, the number of validly cast by paper ballot votes ‘I do not support anyone’ as well as the distribution of validly cast votes by paper ballot among candidate lists. The expert assessment under task 2 had to establish whether the number of invalid ballots entered in the protocol under Article 273 corresponded to the number of invalid ballots delivered to the District Election Commission by the precinct election commissions.
In the course of the check conducted the experts relied on the statutory requirements for determining a vote cast as valid or invalid – Article 278, paras 2 and 3 EC, as well as on the good international practice endorsed by the state, according to which treating too many ballots as invalid should be avoided and in case of doubt the genuine choice of the voter should be established. Thus, they found paper ballots where a validly cast vote had been registered as invalid and vice versa. The experts’ conclusion was that the precinct election commissions had been in most of the cases rather restrictive and had preferred to determine a vote invalid just because the mark crossed (X or Y) went outside the check box of the respective candidate list, without however entering the check box of another candidate list.
The results of the check conducted in relation to the 1,786 polling stations designated under task 1 of the expert assessment show a change in the distribution of validly cast votes between the parties and coalitions in 46.75% of the checked protocols, yet in more than 90% of the cases this change is due to an estimate about (in)validity of the cast vote hat was contrary to the law. The discrepancies established on this basis between what has been entered in the protocol of the precinct election commission and what the expert assessment has established usually vary from one to two votes per candidate list. The changes endorsed by the Court as regards the numbers of validly and invalidly cast votes and their distribution as per candidate lists are not individually specified for each polling station due to their great numbers, yet the accumulate effect of these changes is reflected in the final outcome.
The check of invalid ballots under task 2 of the expert assessment established discrepancies in 37.78% of the checked protocols, confirming the conclusion about the margins of differences in the estimates of the (in)valid votes cast by paper ballots by the precinct election commissions and the expert assessment. The summary results per constituencies are as follows.
The check of the election papers from 14 polling stations in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 155 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established four valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 32 polling stations in 02 Burgas Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 422 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 14 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 11 polling stations in 03 Varna Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 253 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established six valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 7 polling stations in 04 Veliko Tarnovo Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 72 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established four valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 10 polling stations in 05 Vidin Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 118 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established eight valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 7 polling stations in 06 Vratsa Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 46 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 18 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 12 polling stations in 07 Gabrovo Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 112 invalid votes cast by paper ballot did not establish any valid votes cast for candidate lists, hence there is no change in the distribution of the validly cast votes on this basis.
The check of the election papers from 15 polling stations in 08 Dobrich Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 173 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established eight valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 15 polling stations in 09 Kardzhali Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 173 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 20 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 9 polling stations in 10 Kyustendil Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 125 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 46 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 9 polling stations in 11 Lovech Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 158 invalid votes cast by paper ballot did not establish any valid votes cast for candidate lists, hence there is no change in the distribution of the validly cast votes on this basis.
The check of the election papers from 14 polling stations in 12 Montana Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 218 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 14 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 32 polling stations in 13 Pazardzhik Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 530 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 33 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 7 polling stations in 14 Pernik Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 56 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established five valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 11 polling stations in 15 Pleven Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 150 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 20 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 36 polling stations in 16 Plovdiv Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 886 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 24 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 20 polling stations in 17 Plovdiv Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 242 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 20 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 2 polling stations in 18 Razgrad Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 13 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established four valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 19 polling stations in 19 Ruse Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 92 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established three valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 4 polling stations in 20 Silistra Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 42 invalid votes cast by paper ballot did not establish any valid votes cast for candidate lists, hence there is no change in the distribution of the validly cast votes on this basis.
The check of the election papers from 27 polling stations in 21 Sliven Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 483 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 52 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 5 polling stations in 22 Smolyan Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 31 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 12 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 2 polling stations in 23 Sofia Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 25 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established two valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 6 polling stations in 24 Sofia Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 69 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 10 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 10 polling stations in 25 Sofia Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 96 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 11 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 9 polling stations in 26 Sofia Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 136 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established nine valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 13 polling stations in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 231 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established seven valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 4 polling stations in 28 Targovishte Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 85 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established eight valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 13 polling stations in 29 Haskovo Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 255 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 40 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 10 polling stations in 30 Shumen Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 84 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established six valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 13 polling stations in 31 Yambol Constituency where the precinct election commissions found 212 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 23 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
The check of the election papers from 39 polling stations abroad that the Court considered bore relevance to the final election results and where the precinct election commissions found 939 invalid votes cast by paper ballot established 41 valid votes cast for candidate lists.
However, the results as regards the votes counted and entered in the protocols of the precinct election commissions are different. Various discrepancies have been established as regards the votes counted and entered in the precinct election commissions protocols, some of them with the potential to change the election outcome. The Court believes it necessary to point out to some of these discrepancies, illustrating them by the results in some of the polling stations where they have been established. Reference to the polling stations where the respective discrepancies have been found is not exhaustive. The full information for each of the polling stations subject to the check conducted by the Court must be publicly accessible on the website of the Central Election Commission after the present decision has been adopted.
The check has established cases where validly cast votes for one candidate list have been entered in the protocol as cast for another candidate list, besides, the entry has not always been made for the candidate list immediately before or after the candidate list for which the votes were cast. For example:
A total of 56 votes validly cast by paper ballot for nine candidate lists were entered as valid votes for another list in polling station no. 013300014 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency.
A total of 9 votes validly cast by paper ballot for four candidate lists and four valid votes ‘I do not support anyone’ were entered as valid votes for another list in polling station no. 014200012 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency.
A total of 13 votes validly cast by paper ballot for six candidate lists and 5 invalid votes were entered as valid votes for another list in polling station no. 013700020 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency.
A total of 6 votes validly cast by paper ballot for one candidate list were entered as valid votes for another list in polling station no. 192700175 in 19 Ruse Constituency.
A total of 8 votes validly cast by paper ballot for one candidate list were entered as valid votes for another list in polling station no. 244606017 in 24 Sofia Constituency.
A total of 9 votes validly cast by paper ballot for one candidate list were entered as valid votes for another list in polling station no. 244606069 in 24 Sofia Constituency.
A total of 6 votes validly cast by paper ballot for five candidate lists were entered as valid votes for another list in polling station no. 254618059 in 25 Sofia Constituency.
The check has further established instances where invalid votes have been entered as valid votes for one candidate list, such as:
A total of 20 invalid votes have been entered as valid votes for one candidate list in polling station no. 011300001 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency.
A total of 10 invalid votes have been entered as valid votes for one candidate list in polling station no. 011300018 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency.
A total of 30 invalid votes have been entered as valid votes for one candidate list in polling station no. 015300005 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency.
A total of 5 invalid votes have been entered as valid votes for one candidate list in polling station no. 221600035 in 22 Smolyan Constituency.
A total of 10 invalid votes have been entered as valid votes for two candidate lists in polling station no. 273100201in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency.
A total of 8 invalid votes have been entered as valid votes for one candidate list in polling station no. 273600032 in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency.
The check has established instances where validly cast votes by paper ballot were admitted as invalid, such as in polling station no. 223100039 in 22 Smolyan Constituency, for example, where 12 valid votes cast for six candidate lists were entered as invalid.
Further on, the check has established instances where paper ballots certifying validly cast vote for a particular candidate list were not entered in the protocol for the respective candidate list but were added instead to the number of votes cast for another candidate list. Here are some examples:
A total of 14 valid votes cast by paper ballot for one candidate list have not been entered as validly cast for that candidate list in polling station no. 093500012 in 09 Kardzhali Constituency.
A total of 17 valid votes cast by paper ballot for two candidate lists have not been entered as validly cast for these candidate lists in polling station no. 234602022 in 23 Sofia Constituency.
Some paper ballots with validly cast votes for one candidate list have been found that have not been entered in the protocol of the precinct election commission – 21 paper ballots carrying 21 validly cast votes for four candidate lists that were not entered in the protocol were found in polling station no. 254612017 in 25 Sofia Constituency.
In some instances valid votes cast for one candidate list have been entered as valid ‘I do not support anyone’ votes cast by paper ballots –8 valid votes cast by paper ballot for one candidate list have been entered as valid I do not support anyone’ votes in polling station no. 244604014 in 24 Sofia Constituency.
There is one instance – polling station no. 234602039 in 23 Sofia Constituency – where the results entered in the protocol under Article 273 EC were swapped – the result from the voting by paper ballot was entered as the result from the machine vote and vice versa.
Paper ballots with an additional mark were found which pursuant to Article 278, para 3, item 2 EC makes the vote cast thereby invalid. A total of 33 paper ballots in polling station no. 122400017 in 12 Montana Constituency bear such an additional mark that was visibly the result of using the paper ballot as a padding when marking a preference, hence the votes cast thereby were declared invalid.
The graphic expert assessment admitted by the Court has established that entries on paper ballots have been made by persons different from the ones registered as having exercised their right to vote. A number of paper ballots have been established in three constituencies where the mark entered on the ballot indicating the preferred vote has been placed by one and the same person and not by the respective voter. These violations of the right to vote established by the expert assessment gave grounds for the Court to declare invalid the votes cast by these paper ballots, namely the following:
95 votes cast in polling station no. 060800027 in 06 Vratsa Constituency;
72 votes cast in polling station no. 122400033 in 12 Montana Constituency; and
106 votes cast in polling station no. 152400205 in 15 Pleven Constituency.
The check has further established missing paper ballots among the election papers of some polling stations presented to the Court such as:
The paper ballots for 58 votes entered as valid ones for two candidate lists in the protocol of polling station no. 011100031 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency are missing.
The paper ballots for 101 votes entered as valid ones for two candidate lists in the protocol of polling station no. 011300001 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency are missing.
The paper ballots for 28 votes entered as valid ones for different candidate lists in the protocol of polling station no. 011300020 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency are missing.
The paper ballots for 11 votes entered as valid ones for different candidate lists in the protocol of polling station no. 013700018 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency are missing.
The paper ballots for 150 votes entered as valid ones for different candidate lists in the protocol of polling station no. 020100046 in 02 Burgas Constituency are missing.
The paper ballots for 9 votes entered as valid ones for one candidate list in the protocol of polling station no. 030602130 in 03 Varna Constituency are missing.
The paper ballots for 54 votes entered as valid ones for different candidate lists in the protocol of polling station no. 234610009 in 23 Sofia Constituency are missing.
The paper ballots for 5 votes entered as valid ones for one candidate list in the protocol of polling station no. 244605028 in 24 Sofia Constituency are missing.
The paper ballots for 335 votes entered as valid ones for different candidate lists in the protocol of polling station no. 270700016 in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency are missing.
The paper ballots for 145 votes entered as valid ones for different candidate lists in the protocol of polling station no. 273100115 in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency are missing.
The paper ballots for 294 votes entered as valid ones for one candidate list in the protocol of polling station no. 283500103 in 28 Targovishte Constituency are missing.
Missing paper ballots which are the only means to certify the vote cast by paper ballot by a voter means missing valid votes for the respective candidate list. Thus, the Court has declared invalid the respective number of votes entered as validly cast votes for the respective candidate list in the protocols of these precinct election commissions under Article 273 EC. The Court deems it is necessary to expressly point out that missing paper ballots on the basis of which valid votes have been entered in the protocol for a certain candidate list is but the starkest manifestation of the legal effects of the failure of precinct election commissions and municipal administrations alike to comply or to fully comply with the requirements under Article 274 EC and the Methodological Instructions of the Central Election Commission concerning packaging of ballots and other election papers. The relation between these facts is clearly demonstrated when comparing data about those constituencies where failure to comply with the requirement under Article 274 EC is most significant and where the number of replacements of members of the precinct election commissions is the greatest, with the established discrepancies between entries in the protocols of the precinct election commissions and missing paper ballots in the election papers presented to the Court.
The check of the results of the vote cast by paper ballots conducted in the framework of the two expert assessments gives grounds to conclude that the basic reason for the differences between what the precinct election commissions declared in terms of numbers of valid votes cast by paper ballots and their distribution per candidate lists and what the Court established by the check is the assessment of the precinct election commissions as to meeting the requirements of Article 278, paras 2 and 3 EC as regards validity or invalidity of the votes cast by paper ballots. This assessment was not always made in accordance with the statutory requirements which justifies the allegations made by the applicant in constitutional case no. 35/2024 as to unlawful application of Article 278, paras 2 and 3 EC by some of the precinct election commissions checked in the framework of the expert assessment admitted by the Court.
The check has further warranted the allegations of the applicants in the five constitutional cases as to undue interference with paper ballots and discrepancies between the number of votes actually cast per candidate lists and the number of votes entered in the protocols of the precinct election commissions, albeit in relation to an insignificant number of polling stations compared to the total number of checked polling stations.
b) as by machine vote от
The applicants in constitutional cases nos. 34/2024, 35/2024, and 36/2024 further on allege illegality of the elections due to violations of the Election Code related to the machine vote.
There are no specific data about violations related to the machine vote in the application of 8 November 2024 with which the applicant in constitutional case no. 34/2024 seized the Court. However, arguments are brought in the additional application of 11 December 2024 and the two opinions presented on 26 February 2025 about ‘established discrepancies between the paper protocols and flash memory sticks from the machine vote’ as well as ‘discrepancies between the machine counterfoils and the ones registered in the respective protocols’.
The applicant in constitutional case no. 35/2024 points out that the discrepancies between the information contained in the flash memory of the specialized machine voting devices and the information entered in the protocol of the precinct election commission should be certified by means of a control report. Hence, discrepancies which are not established by a control report ‘should be treated as an indication that the results of the machine vote have been wrongfully established’, which is a ground for recounting the votes in specifically indicated polling stations.
The applicant in constitutional case no. 36/2024 points out to ‘numerous problems encountered with the machine vote and failure to provide to the voter a paper ballot as a replacement’ relying on a publication in the media and a signal of BOETS – Bulgaria United with One Purpose Association to the Central Election Commission of 27 October 2024 regarding the quality of the paper printing the machine vote ballots.
‘Voting by a machine vote ballot’ was introduced in the Election Code promulgated SG No. 19/2014. Article 206 EC (wording as per the adoption of the Election Code) grants the voter the right to vote either by paper ballot or by a machine vote ballot. The Constitutional Court has already pronounced on the compliance of various aspects of this method of exercising the right to vote with the Constitution (Decision No. 9/2021 in constitutional case no. 9/2021; Decision No. 9/2023 in constitutional case no. 4/2023).
What is relevant to the subject matter of the present case, namely the legality of the elections held on 27 October 2024, is not whether this method of exercising the right to vote corresponds to the Constitution, but whether exercising the right to vote by means of a voting machine and the way this vote is acknowledged when the voting device does not print out a machine vote ballot in accordance with Article 268, para 4 EC to certify the vote duly cast by the voter in support of a candidate list or not in support of any (‘I do not support anyone’ pursuant to Article 212, para 3 EC) is in compliance with the Constitution. This is not a case covered by Article 269 EC when machine voting appears to be ‘compormised due to unforeseen circumstances’ and is therefore terminated in the respective polling station. The case at hand concerns exercising the right to vote failing to comply with the requirements set forth in Article 268, para 4 EC, namely that the machine voting device prints out a ballot certifying the vote cast by the voter.
The chronology of the amendments made to the regulation of the machine vote in the Election Code demonstrates the lack of a consistent legislative concept. This leads to inconsistency in the technological solutions and creates mistrust towards this method of exercising the constitutional right to vote, objectively impedes the exercise of the right to vote and creates an insecure environment for exercising the right to vote. In the course of the frequent parliamentary elections over the last three and a half years – from the elections held on 4 April 2021 for 45th National Assembly to the challenged elections held on 27 October 2024 for 51st National Assembly – Parliament changed twice the legal regulation of the machine vote, which runs contrary to the international standards endorsed by the country that require that changes to election regulations be done at least a year prior to elections.
Despite the legislative hyper activity as regards the machine vote, despite the parliamentary elections held twice following a legal regulation that provided for machine voting, and despite what has been established in the practice so far, namely that the machine voting devices do not always print out a ballot to certify the vote cast by the voter, the legislator failed to provide for a procedure for the precinct election commission to act in case no ballot certifying the vote cast by the voter is printed out and to ensure that exercising the right to vote in such cases complies with the constitutional requirements, including the correct count of votes cast.
This behaviour of the legislator runs contrary to the reasons for which the established manner of acknowledging the results of the machine vote by printing out a protocol was repealed. A major reasoning of the legislator for repealing the former manner of acknowledging the results of the machine vote was the ‘demonstrated unwillingness or lack of capacity of the Central Election Commission, despite CEC decisions to that end, to guarantee that the receipts will be counted in full, and the results from the counting by hand will be compared to the data in the machine generated protocol’. Leaving aside the fact that the legislator amends the law due to the ‘unwillingness’ of a public body to discharge a statutory obligation and the lack of ‘capacity’ of this public body whose members are appointed upon proposals of the parliamentary represented parties and coalitions, the failure to regulate in the law this particular situation, viewed in the context of other statutory obligations of the Central Election Commission, is but a source of mistrust towards the electoral process.
Before the amendments made (promulgated SG No. 36/2021), Article 271 EC used to read that ‘the precinct election commission shall report the results of the machine vote in the polling station by printing out a protocol from the machine’, where ‘in establishing the voting results, the number of voters who cast their vote by a machine equals the number of votes confirmed by machine voting, which in turn equals the number of receipts printed out by the machine’. The amendment made by the legislator stripped of any legal substance the recording device of the voting machines since according to the provision of Article 271 EC currently in force ‘the precinct election commission shall report the results from the machine voting by counting the machine vote ballots’. (The legislator’s use of different terms to denote one and the same legally relevant technical device is not being commented upon – ‘technical device for machine voting’, ‘device for machine voting’, ‘specialised devices for voting’, ‘technical device for voting’, ‘device for voting’, in addition to the voting performed by these devices – voting by any of the above listed, and ‘machine voting’.)
Despite stripping the recording device of the technical devices for machine voting (the so called flash memory) of any legal significance for reporting the election results, the legislator has maintained the requirement in Article 268, para 4 EC for a record of the recording technical device in case the voter cast his vote by a machine. The legislator has further maintained the obligation for the precinct election commission under Article 215, para 2 EC to take delivery of the ‘technical devices’ on the pre-election day; the obligation for the precinct election commission under Article 285, para 1 EC to deliver to the District Election Commission the recording technical device of the machine voting; and the obligation under Article 296, para 1 EC to deliver to the District Election Commission and the Central Election Commission the recording technical device of the machine voting.
Once the legislator has stripped of legal relevance an action provided for in the Election Code, the single remaining significance of this action is to maintain the impression of machine voting – a recording is made by a technical recording device of the votes cast by the voters, yet this recording bears no legal significance. At the same time, implementing Article 15b, para 1 of the Access to Public Information Act, the Central Election Commission published online and with free access open compilations of data and the resources it maintains. The data from the technical recording devices are such data. However, since they are legally irrelevant, the only end that publishing these data serves is to help form statements that bear no relevance to the election results despite acknowledging the number of machine votings reported by the technical recording devices and thus increase the mistrust in the electoral process.
The applicant in constitutional case no. 35/2024 points out that the discrepancies between the information contained in the flash memory of the specialized devices for machine voting and the information contained in the protocols of the precinct election commissions should be certified in a control protocol. There is no such statutory requirement. A conclusion as to the requirement for correspondence between the information contained in the flash memory of the recording device and the information entered in the protocols of the precinct election commissions may be made solely on the basis of the instructions provided by the Central Election Commission two days prior to the elections, on 25 October 2024 – instructions Nos. ЦИК-НС-10-2004 and ЦИК-НС-10-2008. These instructions were extended following signals received by the Central Election Commission and questions put forward to it, and they specify how the precinct election commissions should act in case they ‘find’ in the machine vote ballot box ‘a machine vote ballot which is empty or from which the vote cast by the voter may not be established’, as well as in cases when ‘following a machine vote the machine prints out an empty (clear) ballot or a ballot in which the vote cast by the voter has not been registered’ or when ‘no ballot is printed out following the voting’.
According to the instructions of the Central Election Commission, in one of the instances a control protocol shall be drawn up to which the ‘defective ballot’ is enclosed; this protocol in turn shall be enclosed to the protocol of the precinct election commission under Article 273, para 1 EC; there, in the section concerning the conditions of the voting, an entry shall be made reading as follows, ‘One defective machine vote ballot found in the ballot box’. Further on, ‘after taking the defective ballot out, the data from counting the remaining machine vote ballots shall be entered in section 11 of the precinct election commission protocol’. The protocol shall be delivered to the District Election Commission, respectively the Central Election Commission "with controls that worked because of the defective ballot.". In another instance a control protocol shall be drawn up, which together with the defective ballot if such is printed out shall be enclosed to the protocol of the precinct election commission under Article 273 EC; ‘voters are allowed to vote again only by paper ballot in the same way in which they machine voted by a defective ballot’. There are no requirements as regards the content of the control protocol or recording in it the fact that the voter was allowed to vote ‘again only by paper ballot’.
The two instructions of the Central Election Commission attempted to bring some order in reporting cases where the technical device for machine voting prints no ‘ballot indicating the vote cast’ by the voter. This attempt was made two days prior to the elections, amidst multiple replacements of members of precinct election commissions that have been established, including in the two days preceding the elections. However, since the legislator has laid down that the single legally relevant proof of a validly cast machine vote shall be a machine vote ballot ‘indicating the vote cast’ by the voter, complying with the instructions of the Central Election Commission or failure to do so bears no relevance to the election results in the respective polling station.
The Constitutional Court is not competent to rule whether, if at all, or to what extent the decisions adopted by the Central Election Commission pursuant to Article 213c, para 1 EC are adequate to achieve the purpose of Article 212, para 4 and Article 268, para 4 EC, namely print out a ballot where the machine vote cast by the voter exercising his right to vote is indicated, or to what extent the technical device itself is capable of producing in all cases the printing out required by the law.
However, the fact of ‘no machine vote ballot printed out’ to indicate the vote cast by the voter is an objective one and it definitely has the potential to arouse significant mistrust in the electoral process. The publicly accessible discrepancies between the number of machine votings entered in the protocol of the precinct election commission under Article 273 EC, and the number of votings registered by the recording device of the voting machines demonstrate certain unclarities and inaccuracies related to citizens’ exercising their right to vote.
In the case where a defective ballot is found out in the special machine vote ballots box, the vote of the voter who has exercised his right to vote by means of a technical device for machine voting and has registered through this device in an unambiguous way his vote in support of a particular candidate list, has further on received a confirmation of his choice that has been visualized on the screen of the recording device, has his vote recorded by the recording device, has received a message that the voting has been completed, has received a ballot which he placed in the box specifically designed for machine vote ballots – the vote of this voter will not be accounted for because the ballot printed out does not indicate his vote, yet the voter is unaware of the fact that he has not been given the chance to duly exercise his right to vote.
In case the voting machine has not printed out a ballot indicating the vote cast and the voter has established this fact, he should be entitled to vote again by a paper ballot. Otherwise the voter will be deprived of the right laid down in Article 206, para 1 EC to vote by paper ballot or by machine ballot since none of the two admissible exceptions – under Article 212, para 5 and Article 269 EC allowing for deprivation of the right to vote are in place.
In view of the requests made by the applicants and the arguments raised by them, the Court commissioned the experts to establish under task 1 of the expert assessment whether the number of validly cast machine votes per candidate lists corresponds to the information contained in the memory of the specialized voting device.
The check of the election papers from the polling stations under task 1 of the expert assessment commissioned by the Court and the findings made by the Court on the basis of the documentary evidence presented by the Central Election Commission such as control protocols of the precinct election commissions and enclosed to them printed machine vote ballots from which the specific vote cast could not be established warranted a conclusion that in a significant number of cases the precinct election commission duly reported the failed indication of the vote cast on the printed receipt, allowed the voter to vote again by paper ballot, entered the voter’s name and personal identity number in the protocol, together with the fact that he was granted a repeated voting by paper ballot, despite the lack of clear instructions by the Central Election Commission about entering this fact in the control protocol.
The analysis of the data per constituencies demonstrates diverse approaches adopted by the precinct election commissions for complying with the instructions of the Central Election Commission. Some precinct election commissions enclosed the control protocol to the protocol under Article 273 EC, together with the defective ballots. Others left the defective ballots in the sack with election papers, entering them in the protocol together with the valid votes ‘I do not support anyone’ cast by machine voting or simply left them together with all election papers. For yet others there are no evidence whatsoever what they did with the defective machine vote ballots as there are no defective ballots among the election papers, and to the best of the Court’s knowledge, no defective ballots have been delivered to the Central Election Commission.
The results of the checked precinct election commissions, together with what has been established by the check of the election papers and the documentary evidence presented by the Central Election Commission, show the following.
There is no tangible evidence, be it machine vote ballots printed by a voting machine with no indication of the vote cast or control protocols, about 133 votings in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency. The total number of persons according to the flash memory who voted by a machine vote in the constituency for candidate lists or by ‘I do not support anyone’ is 7,693.
The total number of persons who voted in 02 Burgas Constituency according to the flash memory is 8,185; there is no evidence thereof about 420 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 03 Varna Constituency according to the flash memory is 8,293; there is no evidence thereof about 88 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 04 Veliko Tarnovo Constituency according to the flash memory is 4,284; there is no evidence thereof about 225 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 05 Vidin Constituency according to the flash memory is 796; there is no evidence thereof about 15 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 06 Vratsa Constituency according to the flash memory is 2,158; there is no evidence thereof about 104 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 07 Gabrovo Constituency according to the flash memory is 1,259; there is no evidence thereof about 14 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 08 Dobrich Constituency according to the flash memory is 1,036; there is no evidence thereof about 37 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 09 Kardzhali Constituency according to the flash memory is 2,165; there is no evidence thereof about 67 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 10 Kyustendil Constituency according to the flash memory is 1,447; there is no evidence thereof about 14 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 11 Lovech Constituency according to the flash memory is 649; there is no evidence thereof about 37 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 12 Montana Constituency according to the flash memory is 1,086; there is no evidence thereof about 21 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 13 Pazardzhik Constituency according to the flash memory is 3,334; there is no evidence thereof about 73 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 14 Pernik Constituency according to the flash memory is 1,172; there is no evidence thereof about 163 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 15 Pleven Constituency according to the flash memory is 3,428; there is no evidence thereof about 50 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 16 Plovdiv Constituency according to the flash memory is 10,616; there is no evidence thereof about 177 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 17 Plovdiv Constituency according to the flash memory is 2,920; there is no evidence thereof about 85 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 18 Razgrad Constituency according to the flash memory is 773; there is no evidence thereof about 6 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 19 Ruse Constituency according to the flash memory is 5,680; there is no evidence thereof about 45 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 20 Silistra Constituency according to the flash memory is 796; there is no evidence thereof about 18 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 21 Sliven Constituency according to the flash memory is 1,441; there is no evidence thereof about 55 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 22 Smolyan Constituency according to the flash memory is 1,327; there is no evidence thereof about 12 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 23 Sofia Constituency according to the flash memory is 36,093; there is no evidence thereof about 663 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 24 Sofia Constituency according to the flash memory is 15 9811; there is no evidence thereof about 358 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 25 Sofia Constituency according to the flash memory is 9,995; there is no evidence thereof about 146 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 26 Sofia Constituency according to the flash memory is 2,973; there is no evidence thereof about 128 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency according to the flash memory is 6,633; there is no evidence thereof about 157 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 28 targovishte Constituency according to the flash memory is 708; there is no evidence thereof about 4 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 29 Haskovo Constituency according to the flash memory is 2,622; there is no evidence thereof about 34 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 30 Shumen Constituency according to the flash memory is 2,968; there is no evidence thereof about 18 persons.
The total number of persons who voted in 31 Yambol Constituency according to the flash memory is 1,922; there is no evidence thereof about 21 persons.
The total number of persons who voted abroad according to the flash memory is 9,180, and the number of votings for which there no evidence is 57.
The machine votings for which there is no tangible evidence as required by the instructions of the Central Election Commission – either a defective ballot or a control protocol – are legally irrelevant to the election results as the legislator considers validly cast only the vote for which there is a machine vote ballot indicating the specific vote cast by the voter; the law does not recognize invalid machine vote ballots. According to the regulation the legislator has laid down as regards exercising the right to vote by means of technical devices for machine voting, the recording made by the technical devices for machine voting is irrelevant to the election results. As the Court has stated above, it only serves to confirm the impression of machine voting.
In addition to what has been established as regards machine voting, the check has further established discrepancies in entering the results in the protocols of the precinct election commissions under Article 273 EC. The Court finds it necessary to point out to these discrepancies by illustrating them, just like in the case with the paper ballots, by some examples, which are not exhaustive of the findings.
A wrong entry of defective ballots has been established – ballots bearing no mark of the vote cast by machine vote have been entered as votes ‘I do not support anyone’ validly cast by machine vote. This is a frequent manner of ‘dealing’ with defective machine vote ballots, and although it does not affect the number of valid machine votes distributed among the candidate lists, it interferes with the actual number of validly cast machine votes and thus distorts the results. For example, 13 defective machine vote ballots have been counted as valid ‘I do not support anyone’ votes in polling station no. 03060108 in 03 Varna Constituency, thus including in the number of valid machine votes such votes which the legislator determines as invalid because there is no ‘machine vote ballot’ within the meaning of Article 212, para 4 EC to prove them.
Instances have been established in relation to the machine vote ballots, just like in relation to the paper ballots, where valid machine vote ballots clearly indicating the vote cast in support of a candidate list have been entered in the protocols of the precinct election commissions as votes for another candidate list. Here are some examples:
A total of 14 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of six candidate lists in polling station no. 013300014 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
A total of 7 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of six candidate lists in polling station no. 013700018 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
A total of 13 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of six candidate lists and 5 validly cast votes ‘I do not support anyone’ in polling station no. 013700020 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
A total of 8 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of four candidate lists and 3 validly cast votes ‘I do not support anyone’ in polling station no. 014200012 in 01 Blagoevgrad Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
A total of 15 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of one candidate list in polling station no. 030604349 in 03 Varna Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
A total of 6 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of one candidate list in polling station no. 042000015 in 04 Veliko Tarnovo Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
A total of 9 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of one candidate list in polling station no. 082800098 in 08 Dobrich Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
A total of 8 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of one candidate list in polling station no. 172800007 in 17 Plovdiv Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
A total of 4 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of one candidate list in polling station no. 19050001 in 19 Ruse Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
A total of 5 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of one candidate list in polling station no. 234615123 in 23 Sofia Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
A total of 21 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of one candidate list in polling station no. 254618037 in 25 Sofia Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
A total of 7 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of one candidate list in polling station no. 293400036 in 29 Haskovo Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
A total of 7 valid machine vote ballots cast in support of one candidate list in polling station no. 293400052 in 29 Haskovo Constituency have been entered in the protocol as valid votes for another candidate list.
An entry has been established in the protocol of the precinct election commission of valid votes certified by defective ballots – for example, 7 validly cast votes in support of 4 candidate lists have been entered on the basis of defective ballots in polling station no. 293300010 in 29 Haskovo Constituency.
Further on, instances of failure to count validly cast machine votes for which machine vote ballots were present have been established. For example, 5 validly cast machine votes have not been entered for the candidate list for which they were cast in polling station no. 143600006 in 14 Pernik Constituency.
Likewise, in one instance validly cast votes by paper ballot in support of one candidate list have not been accounted for, while the same number of votes cast by available machine vote ballots in support of the same candidate list have been accounting for – polling station no. 130800007 in 13 Pazardzhik Constituency, where 7 valid votes cast by paper ballot have not been counted while at the same time 7 valid votes from missing machine vote ballots have been counted.
The check has further established, similarly to the findings regarding the paper ballots, missing machine vote ballots that were entered in the precinct election commission protocols as valid votes cast for candidate lists. Here are some examples:
A total of 14 machine vote ballots registered as validly cast votes for four candidate lists are missing from the election papers of polling station no. 090200015 in 09 Kardzhali Constituency that were presented to the Court for verification.
A total of 6 machine vote ballots registered as validly cast votes for two candidate lists are missing from the election papers of polling station no. 212000169 in 21 Sliven Constituency that were presented to the Court for verification.
A total of 111 machine vote ballots registered as validly cast votes for different candidate lists are missing from the election papers of polling station no. 234610009 in 23 Sofia Constituency that were presented to the Court for verification.
A total of 7 machine vote ballots registered as validly cast votes for one candidate list are missing from the election papers of polling station no. 234602022 in 23 Sofia Constituency that were presented to the Court for verification.
A total of 99 machine vote ballots registered as validly cast votes for different candidate lists are missing from the election papers of polling station no. 273600017 in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency that were presented to the Court for verification.
A total of 16 machine vote ballots registered as validly cast votes for different candidate lists are missing from the election papers of polling station no. 270700016 in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency that were presented to the Court for verification.
Pursuant to Article 271 EC, a machine vote ballot within the meaning of Article 212, para 4 EC is required to certify a validly cast vote. The lack of such a ballot makes it impossible to prove the number of valid votes entered in the precinct election commission protocol for a candidate list or ‘I do not support anyone’. Thus, similarly to the situation with the paper ballots, the Court has reduced the number of valid votes entered in protocols by the number of votes for which the ballots were missing. Missing machine vote ballots in the election papers presented to the Court for verification on the basis of which valid votes for a candidate list have been entered in the precinct election commission protocols is, similar to the case with the paper ballots, the starkest manifestation of the legal effects of the failure of precinct election commissions to comply or to fully comply with the requirements under Article 284 EC and the Methodological Instructions of the Central Election Commission concerning packaging of ballots and other election papers.
Taking account of the applicant’s allegations and the findings of the expert assessment under task 1, the Court required the Central Election Commission to provide information about the start of voting, the time each vote was cast, and the end of voting in the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 for polling stations nos. 090800006, 090800016, and 090800038 in 09 Kardzhali Constituency and polling stations nos. 321180531 and 321180541 abroad.
The information presented to the Court for the three polling stations in 09 Kardzhali Constituency shows that 110 voters voted in polling station no. 090800006, 94 voted in polling station no. 090800016, and 142 voted in polling station no. 090800038, all by means of a machine voting technical device. The maximum number of voters who exercised their right to vote in the course of one hour was 28 voters.
The information presented to the Court concerning polling stations nos. 321180531 and 321180541 abroad shows that a total of 565 voters (569 according to data from the flash memory) voted in the period from 7:19:57 to 19:51:15 hrs. on E Day in polling station no. 321180541 abroad, all by means of a machine voting technical device. Their distribution is as follows: 17 voters by 8.00 hrs.; 31 voters from 8.00 to 9.00 hrs.; 35 voters from 9.00 to 10.00 hrs.; 44 voters from 10.00 to 11.00 hrs.; 63 voters from 11.00 to 12.00 hrs.; 66 voters from 12.00 to 13.00 hrs.; 77 voters from 13.00 to 14.00 hrs.; 79 voters from 14.00 to 15.00 hrs.; 70 voters from 15.00 to 16.00 hrs.; 43 voters from 16.00 to 17.00 hrs.; 19 voters from 17.00 to 18.00 hrs.; 18 voters from 18.00 to 19.00 hrs.; and 6 voters from 19.00 to 20.00 hrs.
A total of 440 voters (452 according to data from the flash memory) voted in the period from 7:11 to 19:34 hrs. on E Day in polling station no. 321180531 abroad, all by means of a machine voting technical device. Their distribution is as follows: 6 voters from 7.11 to 8.00 hrs.; 22 voters from 8.00 to 9.00 hrs.; 37 voters from 9.00 to 10.00 hrs.; 47 voters from 10.00 to 11.00 hrs.; 46 voters from 11.00 to 12.00 hrs.; 59 voters from 12.00 to 13.00 hrs.; 69 voters from 13.00 to 14.00 hrs.; 64 voters from 14.00 to 15.00 hrs.; 48 voters from 15.00 to 16.00 hrs.; 21 voters from 16.00 to 17.00 hrs.; 14 voters from 17.00 to 18.00 hrs.; 16 voters from 18.00 to 19.00 hrs.; and 2 voters from 19.00 to 20.00 hrs.
Article 206, para 1 EC grants the voter the right to choose how to exercise his right to vote – either by paper ballot or machine ballot. The legislator has provided for two exceptions, namely Article 212, para 5 and Article 269 EC. The Constitutional Court has ruled that the two methods of voting are equivalent, ‘statutory guarantees are in place against arbitrary interference in independently formulating and expressing the will of every citizen by either method of voting, which is the very essence of the right to vote’ (Decision No. 9/2023 in constitutional case no. 4/2023). Thus, the fact that all voters in a polling station have exercised their right to vote by means of a technical machine voting device does not warrant by itself any conclusions as to the validity of the vote cast. The question arising from the facts concerning polling stations nos. 321180541 and 321180531 is whether the constitutional requirements regarding exercising the right to vote have been met in relation to these voters.
A total of 79 voters exercising their right to vote by means of a machine voting technical device in the course of 60 minutes definitely raises the question whether each and every voter has had the chance to freely and secretly exercise their right to vote. However, as has been already state above in relation to voting by a mobile ballot box, regardless of the doubts raised by the facts pertaining to the manner in which the right to vote has been exercised, in view of the secrecy of the vote and provided that the vote has been cast in the framework of the E Day, the Court may not, based on propositions or doubts, declare a vote invalid. It should be pointed out furthermore that the votes cast in polling station no. 321180541 are distributed among 12 candidate lists, yet more than 90% of the votes are cast in support of only two candidate lists, respectively 54.78% and 38.12%. The votes cast in polling station no. 321180531 are distributed among 11 candidate lists, with more than 90% of the votes cast in support of two candidate lists, respectively 69.7% and 21.4%.
The violations made by the precinct election commissions as regards voting, counting and registering the votes cast by means of a technical machine voting device, in their entirety warrant some of the applicants’ allegations.
7. Regarding the request to declare the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 altogether illegal
The applicants in constitutional cases nos. 34/2024, 35/2024, and 36/2024 consider the challenged elections altogether illegal.
The applicant in constitutional case no. 34/2024 points out to ‘numerous violations of the electoral process, both substantive and procedural in character, in the better part of the constituencies in the country’ that have ‘affected the overall nation-wide result of the voting’; he further maintains that ‘the established violations and offences are of a magnitude that indicates a large-scale, significant and inadmissible for a democratic state based on the rule of law violation of the voting rights guaranteed by the law of both citizens and political subjects participating in the election race’.
The applicant in constitutional case no. 35/2024 requests ‘the Constitutional Court to declare illegal the results of the parliamentary elections’ in all 31 constituencies, and to declare illegal the election of ‘the announced elected members of Parliament’. He refers to the proportional representation system in place which does not allow an applicant ‘to specify in advance what changes will occur in the composition of the National Assembly should the elections be found illegal’.
The applicant in constitutional case no. 36/2024 challenges the ‘overall legality of elections for members of the 51st National Assembly’ and is of the opinion that ‘even a small number of manipulated election data in this particular case affects significantly the ultimate elections results on national level’.
The Constitution, which proclaims the principles of universal, equal, and direct secret suffrage, delegates by Article 42, para 2 to the legislator regulating by law the organization and conduct of elections. The Election Code adopted through this delegation fails expressly to regulate the grounds on which the Court may annul elections if their overall legality is challenged pursuant to Article 149, para 1, item 7 in conjunction with Article 66 of the Constitution. This legislative approach is a function of the understanding that the elections for National Assembly are a sovereign act of the people that ensures the legitimacy of political power and the democratic governance of the country. Taking into account that voting for a nationally representative establishment is a sovereign act, it is not the voter’s will that is put to a test, but the actions and acts that guarantee that this will is truthfully transformed into political power because only then the level of correspondence between public preferences and election results will be achieved that will guarantee legitimacy of the political power.
The Court has established violations of the electoral process in the present proceedings – violations related to changes in the composition of precinct election commissions, violations of the requirements for compiling protocols of the precinct election commissions (Article 282, para 2 EC), violations related to packing election papers (Article 284 EC), violations of the requirements for ensuring real-time video surveillance and video recording (Article 272 EC), violations in determining the results of the voting, both in relation to votes cast by paper ballots and by machine voting ballots (Article 206, para 1 in conjunction with Article 278, paras 2 and 3 EC) as well as violations related to entering data about the voting in the protocols (Article 281 EC).
The Court has already clarified in the reasons stated above for each of the alleged violations that the different types of violations affect differently the electoral process. The assessment whether and to what extent the election results reflect the voters’ will and in particular whether there is correspondence between the votes cast by the voters and what has been established by the vote count and entered in the protocols carries but the greatest weight for the decision of the Court.
The violations established by the Court certainly affect negatively the transparency and trust in the overall electoral process, yet they do not result in impossibility to establish the voters’ will or to significant changes of the election results justifying a complete annulment of the elections and hence requiring that voters exercise once again their right to vote in fresh elections.
For these reasons the Court finds the requests of the applicants in the present and joined cases seeking to establish overall illegality of the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 unfounded.
8. Regarding the request to establish illegality of the elections in individual constituencies
The applicant in constitutional case no. 34/2024 in his application and the additional application of 11 December 2024 seeks that the Court establish illegality of the elections conducted in 25 Sofia Constituency due to violations made by the precinct election commission, namely – the late registration of the Free Voters Coalition.
The request has been made after expiry of the time limit set forth in Article 305, para 2 EC, which is why it is inadmissible and no action shall be taken thereupon.
The applicant in constitutional case no. 34/2024 seeks in his opinion of 19 February 2024 that the Court establish illegality of the election results in 15 Pleven Constituency due to ‘mass’ replacements of members of the precinct election commissions.
The request has been made after expiry of the time limit set forth in Article 305, para 2 EC, which is why it is inadmissible and no action shall be taken thereupon.
9. Regarding the request to establish illegality of the elections in the polling stations subject to check by the Court
The applicants in constitutional cases nos. 33/2024 and 37/2024 seek that the Court establish illegality of the elections in specifically identified polling stations. The applicant in constitutional case no. 35/2024 seeks that the Court ‘declare unlawful the results of the parliamentary elections’ in all constituencies, yet he points out that ‘the request made under Article 66 in conjunction with Article 149, para 1, item 7 of the Constitution concerns establishing violations during the voting in the polling stations specified in the annexes to this request’ and that ‘the results in the polling stations listed in Annex 2 to this request have been determined wrongly, and the results from certain polling stations specified in Annexes 1 and 3 should be annulled’. Formulated in this way, the applicant seeks to establish illegality of the elections in specifically identified polling stations.
On the basis of the evidence collected in the case, the Court has established violations of the Election Code in the course of conducting the parliamentary elections on 27 October 2024. Assessed together, the evidence gives grounds to the Court to believe that this finding may lead to changes in the composition of the 51st National Assembly.
Although the Court has established violations which in its opinion may affect the composition of the elected 51st National Assembly as they result in changes in the numbers of valid and invalid votes as well as in the distribution of valid votes per parties and coalitions, the Court cannot establish whether, and if so which Members of Parliament these violations would affect so as to declare their election illegal. The Court cannot establish the specific relation between the violations and the mandates obtained to determine which mandates and which MPs declared elected by Decision No. 3998-НС of 31 October 2024 of the Central Election Commission these violations would affect. This is the result of the system for determining the election results currently in force and of the method endorsed by the legislator for nation-wide allocation of mandates.
The Constitutional Court has ruled that the constitutional legislator has granted to the ‘nation-wide representative establishment to which it delegates the exercise of legislative authority, the discretion as to the organization and conducting of elections, including determining the appropriate electoral system, the methods for casting and counting of votes, and the results of the respective elections’ (Decision No. 9/2023 in constitutional case No. 4/2023).
The proportional electoral system established in the Election Code requires first to determine the number of mandates of the independent candidates in the multi-mandate electoral districts, then to determine the mandates in the multi-mandate electoral districts under the proportional system, then the allocation of mandates for each party and coalition on national level, allocation of mandates for each party and coalition in the individual multi-mandate electoral districts, re-allocation of the mandates in view of the need to ensure correspondence of the number of mandates according to the national and district distribution of mandates, and only afterwards personification of the mandates according to the candidate lists. This requires establishing a correlation between the data established and admitted by the Court as regards valid and invalid votes and their distribution among candidate lists in the polling stations subject to the verification conducted by the Court, on the one hand, and the election results in those polling stations that have not been subject to the verification of the Court, on the other hand, in order to establish the election results on national level.
Hence the Court, having established the number of valid and invalid votes and the distribution of valid votes among the candidate lists, by a ruling of 26 June 2025 tasked the Central Election Commission to establish on national level the following: the total number of paper and machine voting ballots found in the ballot boxes, and the numbers respectively of paper ballots and machine voting ballots; the number of invalid votes cast by paper ballots found in the ballot boxes; the number of valid votes cast for candidate lists of parties, coalitions and independent candidates, and the number of valid votes ‘I do not support anyone’; the distribution of valid votes per candidate lists of parties, coalitions and independent candidates; four percent of the valid votes cast in the country and abroad, without the votes ‘I do not support anyone’; the parties and coalitions which would obtain at least four percent of the valid votes cast in the country and abroad; the distribution of the mandates in the 51st National Assembly and per multi-mandate electoral districts; and to specify in view of the results obtained whether any changes would result in the personal composition of the 51st National Assembly as announced by Decision No. 3998-НС of 31 October 2024 of the Central Election Commission, and if so – about which MPs in particular.
On 12 March 2025, by Decision No. 4152-НС of 12 March 2025 and letter registered by outgoing correspondence No. ЦИК-НС-07-2476/123/, respectively incoming correspondence No. 185 of 12 March 2025 of the Constitutional Court, the Central Election Commission presented to the Court the results of the commissioned recalculation of the election results in line with the findings of the Court as regards valid and invalid votes, valid votes ‘I do not support anyone’ and distribution of valid votes among candidate lists (parties, coalitions, and independent candidates) for the polling stations that were subject to the verification in constitutional case no. 33/2024 and the cases joined to it.
As a result of the recalculation performed by the Central Election Commission, the total number of paper and machine voting ballots found in the ballot boxes is 2,568,992 or 1,698 less compared to the result announced by Decision No. 3998-НС of 31 October 2024 of the Central Election Commission, the number of paper ballots being 1,598,041 or 1,238 less, and the number of machine voting ballots being 970,951 or 460 less. The number of invalid votes cast by paper ballots found in the ballot boxes is 51,791 or 268 more. The total number of valid votes is 2,517,175 or 1900 less, where the number of validly cast votes for candidate lists of parties, coalitions and independent candidates is 2,434,761 or 1695 less, while the number of validly cast votes ‘I do not support anyone’ is 82,414 or 205 less. After the recalculation, four percent of the valid votes cast in the country and abroad stands at 97,390.44, not including the votes ‘I do not support anyone’.
The distribution of valid votes per candidate lists of parties, coalitions and independent candidates according to the number of the ballot and the name therein is changed in the following way:
For 1 Political Party (PP) DOST Democrats for Responsibility, Solidarity and Tolerance – 2253, 7 votes less.
For 2 PP Voice of the people – 7,289, no change.
For 3 Socialist Party ‘Bulgarian Road’ – 1,555, or 15 votes less.
For 4 PP Velichie – 97,497, or 59 votes more.
For 5 Bulgari – 1,727, or 10 votes less.
For 6 BULGARIA MY COUNTRY – 2,771, or 10 votes less.
For 7 PP THERE IS SUCH A PEOPLE – 165,191, or 31 votes more.
For 8 DPS – New Beginning – 280,246, or 1,110 votes less.
For 9 BRIGADA – 1,173, or 8 votes less.
For 10 Party of the Greens – 4,900, or 3 votes more.
For 11 THE LAW – 2,350, or 10 votes less.
For 12 REVIVAL – 325,358, or 108 votes less.
For 13 ALLIANCE FOR RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS – APS – 182,254, or 1 vote more.
For 14 BULGARIAN NATIONAL UNION – ND – 2,225, or 5 votes less.
For 15 BSSD – DIRECT DEMOCRACY – 1,694, no change.
For 16 BLUE BULGARIA – 26,045, or 9 votes less.
For 17 PP MECH – 111,993, or 28 votes more.
For 18 GERB-SDS – 642,521, or 452 votes less.
For 19 ATAKA– 3,972, or 7 votes more.
For 20 PP PEOPLE’S PARTY THE TRUTH AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH – 2,460, or 3 votes less.
For 21 DIRECT DEMOCRACY – 7,933, or 19 votes less.
For 22 Coalition FREE VOTERS (Republicans for Bulgaria, Union of Free Democrats, and Green Union) – 6,290, or 3 votes less.
For 23 BTR – BULGARIA OF LABOUR AND REASON – 1,445, or 1 vote more.
For 24 KOY – Competence, Responsibility, Truth – 2,014, or 8 votes less.
For 25 Coalition RUSOPHILES FOR BULGARIA – 8,855, or 5 votes less.
For 26 COALITION WE CONTINUE THE CHANGE – DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA – 346,074, or 11 more.
For 27 BULGARIAN RISE – 10,311, or 7 votes less.
For 28 BSP – UNITED LEFT – 184,361, or 42 votes less.
For 15.29 CHAVDAR IVANOV POPOV – independent candidate – 2,004, or 4 votes more.
The recalculation leads to changes in the composition of the 51st National Assembly due to the established illegality of the election of 16 MPs as announced by Decision No. 3998-НС of 31 October 2024 of the Central Election Commission announcing the elected MPs in the 51st National Assembly.
The Court has to declare the election of the following MPs illegal:
Esheref Kyazim Esheref, elected MP in 02 Burgas Constituency, coalition ALLIANCE FOR RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS – APS;
Svetoslav Todorov Todorov, elected MP in 03 Varna Constituency, PP REVIVAL;
Ivaylo Hristov Mitkovski, elected MP in 03 Varna Constituency, COALITION WE CONTINUE THE CHANGE – DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA;
Deyan Petev Petkov, elected MP in 04 Veliko Tarnovo Constituency, PP MECH;
Andrey Hristov Valchev, elected MP in 06 Vratsa Constituency, Coalition BSP – UNITED LEFT;
Rosen Krasimirov Ivanov, elected MP in 09 Kardzhali Constituency, PP MECH;
Pavlin Yovkov Yotov, elected MP in 11 Lovech Constituency, Coalition GERB-SDS;
Emil Dimitrov Trifonov, elected MP in 12 Montana Constituency, PP THERE IS SUCH A PEOPLE;
Stanislav Dimitrov Anastasoc, elected MP in 16 Plovdiv Constituency, Coalition DPS – New Beginning;
Borislav Klimentov Petkov, elected MP in 22 Smolyan Constituency, PP MECH;
Alexander Rumenov Nenkov, elected MP in 23 Sofia Constituency, Coalition GERB-SDS;
Ivan Stoynov Kyuchukov, elected MP in 25 Sofia Constituency, PP THERE IS SUCH A PEOPLE;
Viktor Tenchev Papazov, elected MP in 25 Sofia Constituency, PP REVIVAL;
Metin Yalzer Kachan, elected MP in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency, Coalition DPS – New Beginning;
Temenuzhka Petrova Petkova, elected MP in 28 Targovishte Constituency, Coalition GERB-SDS and Nikola Toshkov Dzhambazov, elected MP in 28 Targovishte Constituency, Coalition GERB-SDS, who replaces Temenuzhka Petrova Petkova during the time she serves as Minister of Finance pursuant to Article 302, para 2 of the Election Code; and
Alexander Staykov Markov, elected MP in 31 Yambol Constituency, PP THERE IS SUCH A PEOPLE.
Pursuant to Article 306, para 5 EC, the Court must task the Central Election Commission to determine, on the basis of the findings in the present decision, the results of the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 and to announce the distribution of mandates and the names of the elected MPs.
The Central Election Commission shall, following entry into force of the present decision, provide public access to what the Court has established as regards the polling stations subject to the verification conducted under the constitutional case.
For the considerations stated above and pursuant to Article 149, para 1, item 7 in conjunction with Article 66 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court
R U L E S as follows:
DECLARES illegal the election of the following Members of Parliament:
Esheref Kyazim Esheref, elected MP in 02 Burgas Constituency, coalition ALLIANCE FOR RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS – APS;
Svetoslav Todorov Todorov, elected MP in 03 Varna Constituency, PP REVIVAL;
Ivaylo Hristov Mitkovski, elected MP in 03 Varna Constituency, COALITION WE CONTINUE THE CHANGE – DEMOCRATIC BULGARIA;
Deyan Petev Petkov, elected MP in 04 Veliko Tarnovo Constituency, PP MECH;
Andrey Hristov Valchev, elected MP in 06 Vratsa Constituency, Coalition BSP – UNITED LEFT;
Rosen Krasimirov Ivanov, elected MP in 09 Kardzhali Constituency, PP MECH;
Pavlin Yovkov Yotov, elected MP in 11 Lovech Constituency, Coalition GERB-SDS;
Emil Dimitrov Trifonov, elected MP in 12 Montana Constituency, PP THERE IS SUCH A PEOPLE;
Stanislav Dimitrov Anastasoc, elected MP in 16 Plovdiv Constituency, Coalition DPS – New Beginning;
Borislav Klimentov Petkov, elected MP in 22 Smolyan Constituency, PP MECH;
Alexander Rumenov Nenkov, elected MP in 23 Sofia Constituency, Coalition GERB-SDS;
Ivan Stoynov Kyuchukov, elected MP in 25 Sofia Constituency, PP THERE IS SUCH A PEOPLE;
Viktor Tenchev Papazov, elected MP in 25 Sofia Constituency, PP REVIVAL;
Metin Yalzer Kachan, elected MP in 27 Stara Zagora Constituency, Coalition DPS – New Beginning;
Temenuzhka Petrova Petkova, elected MP in 28 Targovishte Constituency, Coalition GERB-SDS and Nikola Toshkov Dzhambazov, elected MP in 28 Targovishte Constituency, Coalition GERB-SDS, who replaces Temenuzhka Petrova Petkova during the time she serves as Minister of Finance pursuant to Article 302, para 2 of the Election Code; and
Alexander Staykov Markov, elected MP in 31 Yambol Constituency, PP THERE IS SUCH A PEOPLE,
as announced elected MPs by Decision No. 3998-НС of 31 October 2024 of the Central Election Commission announcing the elected MPs in the 51st National Assembly.
DISMISSES the requests made by MPs from 50th and 51st National Assemblies seeking to establish illegality of the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 in their entirety.
TAKES NO ACTION as regards the request made by 58 MPs of the 50th National Assembly seeking to establish illegality of the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 in 15 Pleven Constituency and 25 Sofia Constituency.
TASKS the Central Election Commission to determine, on the basis of the present decision, the results of the parliamentary elections held on 27 October 2024 and to announce the distribution of mandates and the names of the elected MPs.
SENDS a copy of the present decision to the National Assembly, the Central Election Commission, and the applicants in the reviewed constitutional cases.
This decision shall enter into force on the day of the ruling.
Председател: Павлина Панова